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1367 
OUT OF SERVICE: DOES SERVICE TIME 
MANIPULATION VIOLATE MAJOR 
LEAGUE BASEBALL’S COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENT? 
Abstract: Under the current Major League Baseball Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (“CBA”), professional players are eligible to file for salary arbitration 
or free agency once they reach certain thresholds of service time in the league. In 
recent years, however, Major League Baseball teams have taken advantage of the 
construction of service time rules in order to artificially keep players under their 
control at lower salaries for one year longer than the rules appear to contemplate. 
The controversy surrounding service time manipulation hit its apex in 2015, 
when Chicago Cubs prospect Kris Bryant was kept in the minor league system 
just long enough to ensure that his team would gain an additional year of control 
over his contract before he would be eligible to file for free agency. This Note 
discusses the potential for players like Bryant to allege violations of the current 
CBA for service time manipulation, and argues that the service time manipula-
tion debate should set the stage for a reformed service time system in negotia-
tions for the next CBA. 
INTRODUCTION 
After a record-breaking career at the University of San Diego, Kris Bry-
ant was selected by the Chicago Cubs with the second overall pick in the 2013 
Major League Baseball (“MLB”) first-year player draft.1 The Cubs rewarded 
Bryant with a $6.7 million signing bonus, and later assigned him to their low A 
minor league affiliate team.2 In his first one and one-half minor league sea-
sons, Bryant hit for a .327 batting average, .428 on-base percentage, and .666 
slugging percentage to go along with 52 home runs.3 Against major league 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Cubs Sign No. 2 Pick Kris Bryant, ESPN (July 12, 2013), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/
9473682/kris-bryant-signs-chicago-cubs [https://perma.cc/GXY5-E62F]. 
 2 See id. Every team in Major League Baseball (“MLB”) is affiliated with several minor league 
teams arranged in a hierarchy according to player skill level. See FAQs: The Business of MiLB, 
MILB.COM, http://www.milb.com/milb/info/faq.jsp?mc=business [https://perma.cc/L5RU-LVY7] 
(last visited Aug. 14, 2016). Players that sign contracts with an MLB organization can be assigned to 
an affiliate in accordance with their skill level and number of years in professional baseball. See id. 
Players usually spend time in the minor leagues before being called up to play on a team’s major 
league roster. See id. 
 3 Cliff Corcoran, For Cubs, There’s No Longer a Reason Not to Call Up Top Prospect Kris Bry-
ant, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.si.com/mlb/2015/04/16/chicago-cubs-kris-
byrant-service-time-minor-leagues [https://perma.cc/49UR-L99D]. Batting average measures the 
percentage of qualified at bats in which a player is awarded a hit. See Batting Average (AVG), 
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competition in spring training before the 2015 season, Bryant led the Cubs 
with a .425 batting average, .477 on-base percentage, and 1.175 slugging per-
centage with nine home runs.4 
Just before the close of spring training on March 30, 2015, the Cubs as-
signed their twenty-three-year-old star to their minor league camp instead of 
keeping him on the major league roster.5 Given Bryant’s utter dominance of 
pitchers at both the major and minor league levels, there seemed to be no base-
ball-related reason to keep Bryant off of the Cubs’ major league roster.6 In the 
wake of the decision, baseball pundits predicted that the wait for Bryant would 
not be long, and that he would be called up on a day in mid-April that hap-
pened to coincide with the day that marked exactly 171 days remaining in the 
2015 regular season.7  
On April 17, 2015, just as pundits predicted, Kris Bryant was officially 
called up to the Cubs’ active major league roster.8 By the end of the regular 
season, Bryant led all National League rookies in on-base percentage, slugging 
percentage, and home runs, proving to be an essential factor in the Cubs’ 97-
win team.9 He went on to win the Sporting News’ National League Rookie 
                                                                                                                           
MLB.COM, http://m.mlb.com/glossary/standard-stats/batting-average [https://perma.cc/8VC8-XEL8] 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2016). On-base percentage measures the percentage of plate appearances in 
which a player successfully reaches base by being awarded a hit, walk, or hit-by-pitch. See On-base 
Percentage (OBP), MLB.COM, http://m.mlb.com/glossary/standard-stats/on-base-percentage [https://
perma.cc/E899-3PAF]. Slugging percentage measures a player’s ability to hit for power, quantified by 
a weighted formula that includes only singles, doubles, triples, and home-runs, and excludes walks 
and hit-by-pitch. Slugging Percentage (SLG), MLB.COM, http://m.mlb.com/glossary/standard-stats/
slugging-percentage [https://perma.cc/4ZFD-JKL9].  
 4 See Corcoran, supra note 3. 
 5 Kris Bryant to Start Year in Minors, ESPN (Mar. 30, 2015), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/
12587428/kris-bryant-javier-baez-addison-russell-sent-minors-chicago-cubs [https://perma.cc/BC2H-
UMLR]. 
 6 See Corcoran, supra note 3 (discussing Bryant’s stellar minor league and major league batting 
statistics detailed previously in this Part); Craig Goldstein, How the System Screws Kris Bryant and 
Other Rookies, VICE SPORTS (Mar. 27, 2015), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/how-the-system-
screws-kris-bryant-and-other-mlb-rookies [https://perma.cc/QKE6-RXX4] (discussing Bryant’s selec-
tion as Baseball America’s Minor League Player of the Year in 2014). 
 7 See AJ Cassavell, Kris Bryant: Too Good for Opening Day, SPORTS ON EARTH (Mar. 17, 2015), 
http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/113077256/kris-bryant-chicago-cubs-opening-day-mike-olt 
[https://perma.cc/N9C8-T8AT]; Goldstein, supra note 6. 
 8 Jonathan Bernhardt, Kris Bryant’s Belated Call-Up to Chicago Cubs Exposes Flaw in MLB 
System, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/apr/20/kris-bryants-
belated-call-up-to-chicago-cubs-exposes-flaw-in-mlb-system [https://perma.cc/Y6SC-UEQP]. 
 9 Kris Bryant Named NL’s Top Rookie, ESPN (Nov. 17, 2015), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/
14148411/2015-mlb-rookie-year-kris-bryant-chicago-cubs-named-nl-winner [https://perma.cc/3VUS-
XGFR] [hereinafter Kris Bryant Named NL’s Top Rookie]; see Ryan Fagan, Sporting News MLB 
Awards 2015: Cubs’ Kris Bryant Voted NL Rookie of the Year, SPORTING NEWS (Oct. 26, 2015), 
http://www.sportingnews.com/mlb-news/4659279-mlb-awards-2015-national-league-rookie-of-the-
year-kris-bryant-matt-duffy [https://perma.cc/2SS4-PWVX] (discussing Bryant’s massive improve-
ments through the end of the 2015 season as the Cubs strove for ninety-seven wins). The MLB in its 
current form is organized into two separate leagues: the National League and the American League. 
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Player of the Year award, and became only the third unanimous selection since 
2000 for the Baseball Writers’ Association of America’s National League 
Rookie of the Year award.10 
In isolation, the Bryant saga seems like a resounding success for the 
young star, the Cubs’ organization, and baseball fans alike.11 The discontent 
with Bryant’s late call-up before his breakout season, however, caused the Ma-
jor League Baseball Players’ Association (“MLBPA”) to publicly forewarn 
litigation against the MLB and the Cubs.12 Practically, the reason the MLBPA 
                                                                                                                           
See generally Linda C. Brinson, What’s the Difference Between the American and National Baseball 
Leagues?, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://entertainment.howstuffworks.com/american-vs-national-
baseball-league.htm [https://perma.cc/79V5-6QJ6] (last visited Sept. 11, 2016) (providing an over-
view of the National and American Leagues that make up the MLB).  
 10 Fagan, supra note 9 (discussing Bryant’s selection as the Sporting News National League 
Rookie Player of the Year); Kris Bryant Named NL’s Top Rookie, supra note 9 (same). Both of these 
awards honor the best individual first-year player from each league in the MLB on a yearly basis. See 
Rookie of the Year Award by The Sporting News, BASEBALL ALMANAC, http://www.baseball-
almanac.com/awards/aw_snrp3.shtml [https://perma.cc/9VU9-5NW2] (last visited Aug. 14, 2016) 
[hereinafter Rookie of the Year Award by The Sporting News] (discussing the criteria for the Sporting 
News Rookie of the Year Award); Rookie of the Year Award / Jackie Robinson Award, BASEBALL 
ALMANAC, http://www.baseball-almanac.com/awards/aw_roy.shtml [https://perma.cc/DZL9-RL9N] 
(last visited Aug. 14, 2016) (discussing the criteria for the Baseball Writers’ Association of America’s 
Player of the Year Award). The Sporting News is one of the most highly regarded sports magazines in 
the nation. See Rookie of the Year Award by the Sporting News, supra (“The Sporting News is nothing 
short of the most respected and legendary magazine / newspaper in sports history. Their coverage of 
baseball has no rival and they are simply the most respected source of baseball statistics anywhere.”). 
The Sporting News National League Rookie of the Year Award is decided by a ballot of National 
League players. Fagan, supra note 9. The Baseball Writers’ Association of America (“BBWAA”) is 
an organization of nearly all of the credentialed writers who cover the MLB. See About the BBWAA, 
BASEBALL WRITERS’ ASS’N OF AM., http://bbwaa.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/2XHC-JRN4] (last 
visited Aug. 14, 2016) (discussing the criteria for membership in the BBWAA). In addition to voting 
for annual awards such as the Rookie of the Year award, the Most Valuable Player (“MVP”) award, 
the Cy Young award for pitching, and the Manager of the Year award, the BBWAA is also responsi-
ble for electing players to the National Baseball Hall of Fame. Id. 
 11 See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text (discussing Bryant’s stellar performance and 
award recognition after his promotion in the 2015 MLB season). 
 12 See Jason Wojciechowski, The Kris Bryant Situation, as Explained by a Labor Lawyer, VICE 
SPORTS (Apr. 2, 2015), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/the-kris-bryant-situation-as-explained-by-
a-labor-lawyer [https://perma.cc/2YL3-PTXB] (discussing the fallout of Bryant’s late promotion and 
the contemptuous response from the Major League Baseball Players’ Association (“MLBPA”)). When 
Bryant was assigned to the Cubs’ minor league affiliate, the MLBPA posted the following message in 
a series of three tweets posted successively on the organization’s official Twitter account: 
Today is a bad day for baseball. We all know that if [Kris Bryant] were a combination 
of the greatest players to play our great game, . . . and perhaps he will be before all is 
said and done, the [Cubs] still would have made the decision they made today. . . .This 
decision, and other similar decisions made by clubs will be addressed in litigation, bar-
gaining or both. 
The Major League Baseball Players Association (@MLB_PLAYERS), TWITTER (Mar. 30, 2015, 3:28 
PM), https://twitter.com/MLB_PLAYERS/status/582640656352428032 [https://perma.cc/2PJ4-JMWE]; 
The Major League Baseball Players Association (@MLB_PLAYERS), TWITTER (Mar. 30, 2015, 3:29 
PM), https://twitter.com/MLB_PLAYERS/status/582640777941127168 [https://perma.cc/QR7P-
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and Bryant claim to be aggrieved is simple: Kris Bryant had the talent and 
production to start in the Cubs’ major league lineup, but was stashed in the or-
ganization’s minor league team long enough to ensure that Bryant and his 
team-friendly rookie contract would be exclusive to the Cubs for one extra 
year.13 Whether the MLBPA’s claims have legal merit, and if they will ever 
reach the courts, however, is a more contentious and nuanced issue.14 
The MLBPA’s dispute with the Cubs’ treatment of Bryant revolves around 
the use of a measurement called “service time” to determine when a profes-
sional baseball player is eligible to submit his salary to arbitration, or alterna-
tively to become a free agent and negotiate a contract with the team of his 
choosing.15 This Note will explore the concept of service time and its implica-
tions for rookie-contract players under the MLB and MLBPA’s collective bar-
gaining agreement (“CBA”), and examine whether the MLBPA could present a 
valid claim against an MLB team for violation of the CBA for manipulating a 
player’s service time in the team’s favor, or whether there is some viable alter-
native to service time that may be negotiated when the current CBA expires in 
December 2016.16 Part I of this Note provides background information on col-
lective bargaining, the MLBPA, and the CBA.17 Part II discusses the concept 
and incentives of service time manipulation and introduces several case studies 
of potential service time manipulation in recent history.18 Part III introduces 
the implied obligation of good faith in contract law and sets out the ways in 
which it may be violated.19 Finally, Part IV applies the implied obligation of 
                                                                                                                           
DEQE]; The Major League Baseball Players Association (@MLB_PLAYERS), TWITTER (Mar. 30, 
2015, 3:29 PM), https://twitter.com/MLB_PLAYERS/status/582640917582123008 [https://perma.
cc/QS5Z-2VTQ]. 
 13 See Wojciechowski, supra note 12 (explaining the author’s belief that “the Cubs could believe 
that Bryant is going to post psychedelic Barry Bonds numbers from day one and they’d still have sent 
him to [the minor league] for the requisite number of weeks”); Kris Bryant Named NL’s Top Rookie, 
supra note 9 (discussing Bryant’s being left in the minor league despite “an outstanding spring train-
ing” and his resulting promotion just in time to delay his free agency by one season); see also infra 
notes 68–70 and accompanying text (discussing signing bonuses and major and minor league salary 
scales). 
 14 See Craig Calcaterra, The Collective Bargaining Agreement Doesn’t Even Enter into the Kris 
Bryant Situation, Right?, NBC SPORTS (Mar. 31, 2015), http://mlb.nbcsports.com/2015/03/31/the-
collective-bargaining-agreement-doesnt-even-enter-into-the-kris-bryant-situation-right/ [https://perma.
cc/G3AN-5QWG] (disagreeing with Wojciechowski on the standing and merit of the MLBPA’s 
claims against the MLB in the Kris Bryant case). 
 15 See Goldstein, supra note 6 (providing an overview of the MLB’s “service time” rules and how 
they relate to the Cubs’ treatment of Kris Bryant). 
 16 See infra notes 21–245 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 21–91 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 92–140 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 150–166 and accompanying text. Though it sometimes goes by other names, 
perhaps most often “the implied covenant of good faith,” this concept is referred to as “the implied 
obligation of good faith” in this Note. See generally Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good 
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good faith to the context of service time manipulation, discusses potential 
roadblocks to a successful challenge of service time manipulation in the griev-
ance-arbitration process, and analyzes potential alternatives to the service time 
system that may prevent manipulation when the CBA is renegotiated in 2016.20 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF (SERVICE) TIME: FROM THE NLRA TO THE MLB 
Though America’s pastime may seem like just a game, today’s profes-
sional baseball exists on a foundation of decades of conflict, labor law, and 
collective bargaining.21 Section A of this part gives a brief overview of relevant 
aspects of U.S. labor law, including the origins of collective bargaining, arbi-
tration as an alternative to litigation, and judicial review of arbitration 
awards.22 Section B provides a history of the MLB, focusing on the formation 
of the league as it currently stands, the advent of collective bargaining, and the 
beginnings of free agency.23 Finally, Section C discusses several portions of 
the current MLB CBA that are necessary to examine the concept of service 
time manipulation.24 
A. Collective Bargaining, Arbitration, and Judicial Review 
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) was signed into law in 
1935, and set out to protect the rights of workers to freely associate and organ-
ize into labor organizations (generally referred to as unions) and negotiate with 
their employers through the collective bargaining process.25 The NLRA de-
                                                                                                                           
Faith in Contract Interpretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L REV. 
559 (2006) (referring to the concept throughout as “the implied covenant of good faith”). 
 20 See infra notes 167–245 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Tom C.W. Lin, National Pastime(s), 55 B.C. L. REV. 1197, 1197–98 (2014) (describing 
baseball as “a morality play for the great issues facing our laws and our nation” and a reflection of 
conflicts between “individualism and collectivism” and “capital and labor”). See generally Joshua P. 
Jones, A Congressional Swing and Miss: The Curt Flood Act, Player Control, and the National Pas-
time, 33 GA. L. REV. 639 (1999) (discussing the development of the MLB from its inception in the 
context of player unionization and antitrust challenges). 
 22 See infra notes 25–34 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 35–62 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 63–91and accompanying text. 
 25 See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). The National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”) stated its full purpose as follows: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of cer-
tain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate 
these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure 
of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of 
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, 
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other 
mutual aid or protection. 
Id. at § 151. 
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fines “collective bargaining” as the obligation of employer and labor organiza-
tion representatives to negotiate in good faith regarding any and all terms of 
employment, generally to be executed in a contract setting out the agreed-upon 
terms.26 The NLRA also codified the refusal by either an employer or an em-
ployee to engage in collective bargaining as one of many unfair labor practices 
whose prevention was entrusted to the newly-created National Labor Relations 
Board.27 
Congress then passed the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 
more commonly known as the “Taft-Hartley” Act, which modified many pro-
visions of the NLRA and created additional substantive law concerning labor 
management.28 Notably, Taft-Hartley declared that the preferred method of 
settling labor disputes is a grievance-arbitration procedure voluntarily agreed 
upon by the parties under a collectively bargained agreement.29 Because arbi-
tration is a term agreed to as part of the negotiations for each individual collec-
tive bargaining agreement, parties are free to set their own specific arbitration 
rules and procedures.30 
Though federal courts have jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining 
agreements and review violations thereto under Taft-Hartley, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that any grievance and arbitration procedures in such a contract 
must be exhausted before parties can seek judicial review.31 When a court is 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 27 See Id. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3), 160(a). 
 28 See Bashar H. Malkawi, Labor and Management Relationships in the Twenty-First Century: 
The Employee/Supervisor Dichotomy, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (discussing Taft-Hartley’s 
modifications of existing NLRA provisions and its creation of new substantive provisions). See gen-
erally Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. 80–101 (containing the codified provisions 
of the Taft-Hartley Act). 
 29 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 171(c), 173(d); 48 AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 353 (1979) 
(noting that Congress was encouraging arbitration in labor disputes with the Taft-Hartley Act). Since 
Taft-Hartley, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “[c]ollective-bargaining agreements commonly 
provide grievance procedures to settle disputes between union and employer with respect to the interpre-
tation and application of the agreement and require binding arbitration for unsettled grievances.” United 
Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). 
 30 See United Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 38–39 (“Furthermore, it must be remembered that griev-
ance and arbitration procedures are part and parcel of the ongoing process of collective bargaining. . . . 
The parties bargained for arbitration to settle disputes and were free to set the procedural rules for 
arbitrators to follow if they choose.”). A party to a collective bargaining agreement can even bargain 
away the neutrality of a supposedly “neutral” arbitrator. See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. 
Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 548 (2d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter Deflategate II]. In 
2015, after an investigation into an alleged scheme by New England Patriots employees to intentional-
ly deflate footballs used in professional competitions, National Football League (“NFL”) Commis-
sioner Roger Goodell appointed himself as neutral arbitrator after handing out an initial disciplinary 
award. See id. at 532. By the terms of the NFL’s collective bargaining agreement with the NFL’s 
Players Association, the commissioner of the NFL may serve as the arbitration hearing officer at his 
or her discretion. See id. at 532, 548. 
 31 See 29 U.S.C. § 185 (placing suits for labor contract violations in the venue of any U.S. District 
Court with jurisdiction over the parties involved); United Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 37 (holding that 
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asked to review an arbitration decision arising out of a collective bargaining 
agreement, it is not authorized to undertake de novo review of the facts and 
interpretations of the agreed-upon arbitrator.32 If it is at least arguable that the 
arbitrator is interpreting the collective bargaining agreement subject to the ar-
bitrator’s delegated authority, courts are not authorized to second-guess the 
arbitration award.33 Unless the arbitration award reflects the arbitrator’s bias, 
the procedure followed by the arbitrator amounts to affirmative misconduct, or 
the arbitration award is so against public policy that it creates explicit conflict 
with other laws and legal precedents, the court should confirm the award.34 
B. The Fall of the Reserve System and the Development of Free Agency 
In 1876, the National League of Professional Baseball Clubs opened for 
business.35 By 1883, the National League implemented the “reserve system,” 
in which players were permanently bound to the team with which they con-
tracted, and other teams were prevented from negotiating for their services.36 
In 1903, the National League and its main competitor, the fledgling American 
                                                                                                                           
a court with jurisdiction to review collective bargaining agreements must order parties to exhaust all 
grievance and arbitration procedures in a contract before the court can decide a case on the merits). 
 32 See Major League Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001) (discussing the lack of 
authorization that courts have to review decisions that arbitrators make on the merits, even when a 
party believes there was some error of fact or that its argument was misconstrued); United Paper-
workers, 484 U.S. at 37–38 (discussing the extremely limited standard of review in judicial review of 
arbitration awards); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960) (holding 
that courts “have no business weighing the merits of the grievance” when reviewing arbitration 
awards). 
 33 See United Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 38 (“[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably constru-
ing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he 
committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”). 
 34 Id. at 36, 40 n.10, 43. Although the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) does not apply to collec-
tive bargaining agreements coming under the jurisdiction of Taft-Hartley, federal courts often look to 
it for guidance in the creation of federal common law pertaining to labor. See United Paperworkers, 
484 U.S. at 40 n.9. See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006) (containing the 
relevant portions of the FAA often used for guidance). The language concerning affirmative miscon-
duct as a result of arbitration procedure is crafted from similar language in the FAA. See id. § 10; 
United Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 40 nn.9–10. The New England Patriots “deflategate” case illus-
trates a rare example of an arbitration award actually being overturned upon judicial review. See Nat’l 
Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 463 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015). In that case, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York conclud-
ed that NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell’s denial of certain evidence’s admissibility amounted to 
procedural misconduct, and that his decision to uphold a four-game suspension of New England Patri-
ots quarterback Tom Brady reflected “his own brand of industrial justice.” See id. at 466, 471. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit eventually reversed the District Court’s decision, con-
cluding that “this case is not an exceptional one that warrants vacatur” under arbitration review’s 
“substantial deference” standard. Deflategate II, 820 F.3d at 532. 
 35 Jones, supra note 21, at 644, 647. 
 36 Id. at 644. 
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League, agreed to honor each other’s reserve systems and form the preliminary 
structure of today’s MLB.37 
Ten years later, anti-reserve system competitor the Federal League was 
created, and began to pilfer players from clubs in the National and American 
Leagues.38 In order to eliminate competition in the market for top players, the 
MLB agreed to pay the Federal League owners $600,000 to disband.39 After 
being excluded from this payment scheme, the Baltimore Terrapins, a Federal 
League team, sued the MLB for violating antitrust regulations.40 In 1922, in 
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional 
Baseball Clubs, the Supreme Court held that the MLB’s arrangement of games 
between teams from different cities and states was not enough to consider its 
activity interstate in nature, exempting the MLB from regulation under the 
Sherman Act.41 
In 1953, the Supreme Court was faced with another Sherman Act claim 
involving the MLB in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.42 In the years preced-
ing the case, the New York Yankees of the American League attempted to as-
sign the contract of player George Toolson to another team.43 Toolson, not 
wishing to report to his new team, sued the Yankees, claiming that the reserve 
system violated antitrust regulations.44 The Court held that it was bound by 
policy and stare decisis to the Federal Baseball decision, and that the MLB 
would continue to be exempt from antitrust regulation unless Congress lifted 
the exemption.45 After the Court’s affirmation of the MLB’s antitrust exemp-
                                                                                                                           
 37 See id. at 644–45. The MLB existed as a cooperative between the legally separate National and 
American Leagues until 2000, when the league operations were consolidated into a single commis-
sioner’s office run by the MLB. Year in Review: 2000 National League, BASEBALL ALMANAC, 
http://www.baseball-almanac.com/yearly/yr2000n.shtml [https://perma.cc/4BYJ-U2NH] (last visited 
Aug. 14, 2016). 
 38 See Jones, supra note 21, at 645. Federal League teams offered players long-term contracts in 
lieu of a reserve system and were successful in luring many lower-paid players from the leagues. Id. 
 39 See id. (detailing the “bidding war for players” that broke out between the National and Federal 
Leagues and the National League’s subsequent dissolution agreement with the Federal League). 
 40 See id. 
 41 See 259 U.S. 200, 208–09 (1922); Jones, supra note 21, at 645–46. Notably, this case relies on 
a notion of interstate commerce as it was construed much more conservatively before the Supreme 
Court expanded it in 1942 with its decision in Wickard v. Filburn. See Jones, supra note 21, at 647 
(citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942)) (discussing the Supreme Court’s more liberal 
construction of the interstate commerce doctrine after Wickard). 
 42 See 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (comparing the antitrust issues at question to those presented to 
the Court before in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball 
Clubs); Jones, supra note 21, at 648 (discussing the Supreme Court’s revisiting the “exemption ques-
tion” in Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.). 
 43 See Jones, supra note 21, at 648. 
 44 See id. 
 45 See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 356–57 (citing the Court’s ruling in Federal Baseball and the Court’s 
preference that any changes to baseball’s antitrust exemption come about by federal legislation); 
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tion in Toolson, it became clear that individual players would not be able to 
challenge the MLB status quo in courts of law.46 
From 1885 until 1968, organizations of MLB players made several at-
tempts to unionize, but were largely unsuccessful.47 The MLBPA was original-
ly created not as a union, but instead as a fraternal organization.48 In 1966, 
however, the MLBPA hired former chief economist of the United Steel Work-
ers, Marvin Miller, as its executive director.49 Soon after, high-profile players 
began to grow restless with the reserve system.50 In 1968, the Miller-led 
MLBPA was able to negotiate its first collective bargaining agreement, the first 
of its kind in professional sports.51 
In 1969, veteran center fielder Curt Flood was traded from the St. Louis 
Cardinals to the Philadelphia Phillies.52 Citing his dozen years of service to the 
league under the reserve system, Flood refused to report to the team and filed 
suit against the MLB, alleging the reserve system was a collusive price-fixing 
                                                                                                                           
Jones, supra note 21, at 648 (discussing the MLB’s reliance on its antitrust exemption as a reason why 
the Supreme Court left the status of the exemption in Congress’s hands). 
 46 See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text (discussing Toolson and the MLB’s powerful 
antitrust exemption). 
 47 See Jones, supra note 21, at 653 n.113 (discussing several of the players’ attempts to unionize 
from the 1880s until formation of the MLBPA); History of the Major League Baseball Players Asso-
ciation, MLB.COM, http://www.mlbplayers.com/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=211042995&DB_
OEM_ID=34000 [https://perma.cc/RKZ8-W5XB] (last visited Aug. 14, 2016) [hereinafter History of 
the Major League Baseball Players Association] (detailing attempts to unionize from Brotherhood of 
Professional Base Ball Player in 1885 until the formation of the MLBPA). Marvin Miller, the former 
chief economist of the United Steel Workers Union who became the executive director of the MLBPA 
in 1966, attributes the failure of MLB players to unionize for so long to the ignorance of the value of a 
union as well as hostility to the concept of unions in general. See Jones, supra note 21, at 654. Miller 
stated: 
There was a reason for this attitude. From time immemorial, the baseball powers-that-
be forcefed the players propaganda: The commissioner (although appointed and paid by 
the owners) represented the players; players were privileged to be paid to play a kid’s 
game; and (the biggest fairy tale of all) baseball was not a business and, in any case, 
was unprofitable for the owners. 
Id. 
 48 Jones, supra note 21, at 653–54. 
 49 Id. at 653; History of the Major League Baseball Players Association, supra note 47. 
 50 See Jones, supra note 21, at 654–55 (discussing the beginnings of player opposition to the 
restrictions of the reserve clause in the 1960s). The unrest became headline news when then-future 
Hall-of-Famers Don Drysdale and Sandy Koufax staged a double holdout until they both received raises 
from the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1966. See id. See generally Buzzie Bavasi, The Great Holdout, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 1967, http://www.si.com/vault/issue/43018/85/2 [https://perma.cc/CNF4-
XN9B] (providing an in-depth overview of the holdout efforts of Drysdale and Koufax). 
 51 History of the Major League Baseball Players Association, supra note 47. This first iteration of 
the Major League Baseball collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) focused mainly on raising the 
minimum player salary. See id. 
 52 See Jones, supra note 21, at 655. 
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agreement in violation of the Sherman Act.53 In 1972, the Supreme Court held 
in Flood v. Kuhn that the MLB was, in fact, a business engaged in interstate 
commerce, but that Federal Baseball and Toolson created an anomalistic ex-
emption that must continue to be observed.54 
Before Flood was decided, however, the MLBPA in 1970 negotiated its 
first impartial arbitration procedure for the resolution of player grievances un-
der the CBA.55 After Flood’s attempt to destroy the reserve system failed in the 
Supreme Court, the MLBPA went on to leverage the arbitration process that it 
negotiated in order to challenge the system.56 In 1975, pitchers Andy Messer-
smith and Dave McNally filed grievances that charged they should no longer 
be bound by their contracts after having played out their terms.57 The arbitrator 
found that the reserve system was only valid if it were clearly and explicitly 
agreed upon within players’ contracts.58 Because no contracts included clear 
and explicit language binding players to the reserve system, this decision con-
stituted the system’s de facto elimination.59 
The reserve system was officially eliminated in 1976, when the MLB and 
MLBPA negotiated a new CBA that created modern free agency, which pro-
vided that any player with six years of MLB experience would become a free 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See id. (discussing Flood’s discontent and his suit against the MLB). 
 54 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282, 285 (1972); Jones, supra note 21, at 656–57 (explaining 
that the Court “ostensibly disavowed the basic tenets of the Federal Baseball decision that created the 
antitrust exemption,” but still held that the exemption must stand). In Flood, Justice Blackmun, writ-
ing for the majority, reasoned: 
We continue to be loath, 50 years after Federal Baseball and almost two decades after 
Toolson, to overturn those cases judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction, has 
allowed those decisions to stand for so long and, far beyond mere inference and impli-
cation, has clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove them legislatively . . . . Accord-
ingly, we adhere once again to Federal Baseball and Toolson and to their application to 
professional baseball . . . . Under these circumstances, there is merit in consistency even 
though some might claim that beneath that consistency is a layer of inconsistency. 
407 U.S. at 283–84 (citing Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357). 
 55 Jones, supra note 21, at 659. In its original form, players could file grievances to be heard by a 
panel consisting of an impartial permanent arbiter employed by the MLB, an MLBPA representative, 
and a commissioner’s representative. Id. 
 56 See id. (characterizing the MLB’s victory in Flood as “short-lived” and discussing the 1970 
CBA’s impartial grievance-arbitration process). 
 57 See id. at 659–60. Messersmith played in the 1975 season for the Los Angeles Dodgers after 
refusing to sign the contract that the team offered. Id. Once the season ended, he claimed that he 
should be declared free and clear of his contract, and filed a grievance. Id. Dave McNally, a pitcher 
for the Montreal Expos, had a similar claim. Id. at 660. 
 58 Id. at 660. 
 59 See id. at 660, 661. Although the arbitrator specifically stated that his decision did not declare 
the reserve system illegal or unable to be effectuated in a contract if clearly and explicitly stated, the 
decision had the effect of invalidating the reserve system for all existing player contracts. See id. at 
660.  
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agent at the end of his contract.60 Though teams could no longer control play-
ers’ contracts for the duration of their professional baseball careers, owners 
were still able to maintain control for a player’s first six years in the major 
leagues regardless of contract length.61 Though players were not granted free 
agent status outright once their contracts ended, they were able to limit the free 
agent market each offseason, spurring demand for free agents and thereby 
drastically increasing free agent salaries.62  
C. The 2012–2016 Collective Bargaining Agreement 
The current version of the CBA between the MLB and the MLBPA went 
into effect on December 11, 2011, and terminates on December 1, 2016.63 Sub-
section 1 of this section will provide an overview of player contracts, salary 
arbitration, and free agency in the current CBA.64 Subsection 2 will discuss in-
depth the grievance-arbitration process under the current CBA.65 
1. Initial Contracts, Salary Arbitration, & Free Agency 
In the annual first-year player draft, MLB clubs are slotted in reverse or-
der of their standing from the previous season and allowed to select first-year 
players from the United States, Canada, and U.S. territories whose eligibility is 
based on various age and education requirements.66 After a club selects a play-
er, it has a specified amount of time in which to negotiate a contract with the 
player or else lose exclusive draft rights.67 Under the current CBA, this negoti-
                                                                                                                           
 60 See Jones, supra note 21, at 661 (discussing the 1976 CBA and its new free agency provision). 
 61 See id. 
 62 See id. at 661–62 (discussing MLBPA Executive Director Marvin Miller’s supply-and-demand 
incentives to limit the free agent market under the new CBA). 
 63 2012–2016 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between 30 Major League Clubs and the Major 
League Baseball Players Association 1, 142 (Dec. 12, 2011), available at http://mlb.mlb.com/pa/pdf/
cba_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZY2-RVTB ] [hereinafter 2012–2016 Basic Agreement]. 
 64 See infra notes 66–77 and accompanying text. 
 65 See infra notes 78–91 and accompanying text. 
 66 See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, THE OFFICIAL PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL RULES BOOK 44–46 
(2015), available at https://registration.mlbpa.org/pdf/2015MajorLeagueRules.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z96V-ZG3S] [hereinafter OFFICIAL PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL RULES BOOK]; First-Year Player 
Draft Rules, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp [https://perma.cc/XFT3-XJ5H] 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2016). The MLB defines three categories for draft eligibility based on age and 
education level: 
[(1)] High school players, if they have graduated from high school and have not yet at-
tended college or junior college; [(2)] College players, from four-year colleges who 
have either completed their junior or senior years or are at least 21 years old; and [(3)] 
Junior college players, regardless of how many years of school they have completed. 
First-Year Player Draft Rules, supra. 
 67 See OFFICIAL PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL RULES BOOK, supra note 66, at 48–49; First-Year 
Player Draft FAQ, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/faq.jsp [https://perma.cc/TD8J-
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ation almost exclusively consists of reaching agreement on the bonus that the 
club will pay the player to sign a standard seven-year minor league contract.68 
After signing his minor league contract, the player’s salary is determined by a 
fixed scale based on his level in the minor league system and his years of expe-
rience at that level.69 When a player in his initial contract is called up to his 
club’s active major league roster, his salary is determined by the club, subject 
only to the CBA’s minimum salary requirements.70 
When a player is called up to his club’s major league roster, he also be-
gins to accrue “service time,” which is determined by the number of days that 
he spends on the twenty-five-man major league roster during the regular sea-
son.71 According to Article XXI of the CBA, one full year of major league ser-
                                                                                                                           
XM29] (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). As stated on the MLB’s website, “[g]enerally, a selected player 
with college eligibility remaining may sign with the Club that selected the Player from the time of the 
selection until the second or third Friday of July.” First-Year Player Draft FAQ, supra. Players with-
out college eligibility remaining are eligible to sign with their selecting Club until 12:01 AM ET on 
the date that is seven days prior to the next year’s first-year player draft. See OFFICIAL PROFESSIONAL 
BASEBALL RULES BOOK, supra note 66, at 48–49. If a player fails to sign with the drafting team, the 
player may be entered back into the draft pool in subsequent years so long as the eligibility require-
ments are met. See id. at 50. If an eligible player is not selected in the first-year player draft, that play-
er may be signed by any major league or minor league club until the relevant signing deadline for 
college-eligible or non-college eligible players. See id. See generally First-Year Player FAQ, supra 
(providing an overview of the MLB rules for the first-year player draft).  
 68 See Eric Michel, Amateur Draft “Signing Bonus Pools”: The Latest Inequity Made Possible by 
Baseball’s Archaic Antitrust Exemption, 11 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 46, 52–53 (2013). Under the 
previous CBA, teams had the ability to offer draftees major league contracts. See id. at 53. These 
major league contracts allowed teams to specify yearly salaries as well as signing bonuses. See id. 
Under the 2012–2016 CBA, however, teams may only sign draft picks to minor league contracts, so 
the only real negotiation is over up-front signing bonuses. See id. 
 69 Jeff Blank, Minor League Salary, JEFF BLANK SPORTS LAW BLOG, http://www.sportslaw
blogger.com/baseball/salary-information/minor-league-salary/ [https://perma.cc/9YZB-56RN] (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2016). Minor league players are given monthly salaries. Id. Minor league players that 
are on a team’s forty-man roster, or who have previously been on the team’s major league roster, 
however, are given increased annual salaries. See id. (providing an overview of salaries for minor 
league players). 
 70 See Adam Felder, How MLB Keeps Its Players’ Salaries Down, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 10, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/12/mlb-salaries-labor-contract-negotiations/
419889/ [https://perma.cc/XSY5-RDYK] (explaining the trajectory of a player’s salary from the time 
the player enters the league).  
 71 See 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 63, at 96 (“One full day of Major League service 
will be credited for each day of the championship season a Player is on a Major League Club’s Active 
List.”). Every MLB team has an “active roster” consisting of 25 players that are eligible to play in 
MLB games. Baseball Roster History, BASEBALL ALMANAC, http://www.baseball-almanac.com/
articles/baseball_rosters.shtml [https://perma.cc/7RZG-KZ67] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). In addition, 
each team has a forty-man roster, consisting of the 25-man active roster and additional players that are 
eligible to be added to the active roster. Baseball Roster History, supra; see also Theron Schultz, The 
40-Man Roster: How Does It Work?, BREW CREW BALL (Jan. 4, 2009), http://www.brewcrewball.
com/2009/1/4/703125/the-40-man-roster-how-does [https://perma.cc/B9J4-59AS] (providing a gen-
eral overview of the forty-man roster concept in the MLB). A team may also be interested in adding a 
player to its forty-man roster in order to protect him from “Rule 5,” which is a special draft that is 
separate and distinct from the first-year player draft, in which players with certain years of minor 
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vice is credited to a player for every 172 “service days” that he accrues.72 Once 
a player accrues three years (516 days) of service time or gets a special desig-
nation as a “Super Two” player in the top 22 percent of players with between 
two and three years of service time, Article VI of the CBA provides that he is 
eligible to file for salary arbitration.73 In the salary arbitration process, both the 
team and the player submit their preferred salary for the upcoming season and 
are able to argue their case to the arbitrator.74 After the arbitration panel has 
heard both sides, it must select one of the two salaries submitted to award the 
player for the upcoming season.75 
According to Article XX of the CBA, an MLB player is eligible to be-
come a free agent at the end of the season in which he reaches at least six total 
                                                                                                                           
league service who are not on a forty-man roster are eligible to be selected by other MLB teams if 
placed immediately on their forty-man roster. Schultz, supra. In general, once a player is added to a 
team’s forty-man roster, the team has the option of assigning him to a minor league affiliate as many 
times as it chooses and for so long as it chooses for three separate seasons. See Thomas Gorman, The 
BP Guide to Transaction Rules: Options, BASEBALL PROSPECTUS (Jan. 10, 2006), http://www.base
ballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=4700 [https://perma.cc/74SW-PVMP] (providing an in-depth 
explanation of the use of options in the MLB); Jonathan Mayo, ‘Options’ Abound: Common Term 
Explained, MLB.COM (Mar. 30, 2011), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/print.jsp?ymd=20110329&content_
id=17188016 [https://perma.cc/CTS6-9X68] (providing simplified explanations and examples of the 
use of options in the MLB); Schultz, supra. If a player on the forty-man roster is assigned to a minor 
league affiliate for less than twenty days in a single season, however, the team is not considered to 
have used one of its three options. See Gorman, supra; Mayo, supra. Players who are assigned to the 
minor leagues for less than twenty days during a regular season while on a team’s forty-man roster are 
credited major league service time for each day that they were on their minor league assignment as 
well as each day they were on the twenty-five-man active roster. See Steve Adams, Service Time and 
the 40-Man Roster, MLB TRADE RUMORS (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2013/
04/service-time-and-the-40-man-roster.html [https://perma.cc/S24Q-UP86] (discussing the intricacies 
of service time when a player moves between the twenty-five-man and forty-man-rosters). 
 72 See 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 63, at 96. A player can only earn a maximum of 
172 service days per regular season. Id. If a player is on the major league roster for 182 days of the 
regular season, for example, he is only credited for 172 “service days” toward his required total for 
free agency. See id. (identifying 172 days as the maximum amount of service time earned in a single 
season). 
 73 See id. at 17–18. The CBA defines a “Super Two” player as follows: 
[A] Player with at least two but less than three years of Major League service shall be 
eligible for salary arbitration if: (a) he has accumulated at least 86 days of service dur-
ing the immediately preceding season; and (b) he ranks in the top 22% (rounded to the 
nearest whole number) in total service in the class of Players who have at least two but 
less than three years of Major League service, however accumulated, but with at least 
86 days of service accumulated during the immediately preceding season. If two or 
more Players are tied at 22%, all such Players shall be eligible.  
Id. at 18. 
 74 See id. at 19–20 (providing the form of submission of salary figures in arbitration). 
 75 Id. at 22. The arbitrator has no authority to choose a salary other than one of the two that are 
submitted. Id. This system of arbitration is commonly referred to as “final-offer arbitration.” See Da-
vid M. Frederick et al., Race, Risk, and Repeated Arbitration, in BASEBALL ECONOMICS 129, 130 
(John Fizel et al. eds., 1996) (describing the final-offer arbitration model generally and discussing its 
use in baseball).  
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years of Major League service time.76 Therefore, if a player has been on a Ma-
jor League active roster for a total of at least 1032 “service days” in his career 
at the end of any given season, he becomes a free agent and is allowed to nego-
tiate a new contract with any team without any restrictions.77 
2. The Grievance-Arbitration Process 
The grievance-arbitration process is covered by Article XI of the CBA.78 
In “Step 1” of the traditional non-discipline-related grievance process, any 
player who believes he has a valid grievance for a violation of the CBA must 
hold a meeting on his potential grievance with his club.79 If the player and the 
club cannot come to an agreement on a resolution, the player must file the 
grievance with the club within forty-five days of the events that led to the 
grievance.80 At this point, the club has ten days to make a decision in writing 
on the grievance and supply copies of the decision to the player and the 
MLBPA.81 
The player or the MLBPA must then submit a written appeal to the 
MLB’s Labor Relations Department (“LRD”) within fifteen days of the club’s 
decision, or the grievance ends at Step 1.82 After an appeal is filed, “Step 2” 
begins, and representatives from the LRD and the MLBPA have thirty-five 
days to meet regarding the grievance and provide each other with any evidence 
relating thereto.83 No more than ten days after the meeting, the LRD must de-
cide on the grievance and supply copies of the decision to the player and the 
MLBPA.84 If the player or the MLBPA decide not to appeal, the grievance pro-
cess ends at Step 2.85 Upon further appeal, however, the arbitration process 
begins.86 
                                                                                                                           
 76 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 63, at 86. 
 77 See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text (discussing service time calculation and free 
agent eligibility). 
 78 See 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 63, at 38–48 (providing definitions, procedures, 
and miscellaneous terms of the MLB grievance-arbitration procedure). Appendix A to the CBA identi-
fies rules of procedure for grievance hearings before an arbitration panel. Id. at 295–98. 
 79 Id. at 42. If the grievance involves more than one club or a player who is not under contract to a 
club, but is still party to the grievance, the grievance may skip “Step 1” and be filed initially in “Step 2.” 
Id. at 43. 
 80 Id. at 43 A player may also file the grievance within forty-five days of “the date on which the 
facts of the matter became known or reasonably should have become known to the player.” Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 42. 
 83 Id. Representatives from the related player and club may also be included at this discussion 
upon mutual agreement of the MLBPA and the MLB’s Labor Relations Department (“LRD”). Id. 
 84 Id. at 43. 
 85 Id. 
 86 See id. at 43 (providing guidelines for the transition from Step 2 to the arbitration process). 
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To begin the arbitration process, the player or the MLBPA must submit a 
written appeal within fifteen days of the LRD’s decision to a “Panel Chair,” 
which is an impartial arbitrator agreed upon by both the MLBPA and the 
LRD.87 The Panel Chair then schedules and presides over a hearing on the 
grievance.88 As soon as possible after the close of the hearing, the arbitrational 
panel must issue a decision consistent with its authority on the grievance.89 
After the decision has been issued, the grievance-arbitration procedures of the 
CBA are considered finalized.90 Parties can seek confirmation or appeal of this 
disposition in federal court.91 
II. THE SERVICE TIME MACHINE 
An MLB player becomes eligible for salary arbitration or free agency 
once he reaches certain thresholds of service time measured in service years, 
each consisting of 172 service days.92 This part will discuss the ways in which 
MLB teams utilize the service time accrued by players under team control to 
the team’s advantage.93 Section A of this part examines the method by which 
teams manipulate a player’s service time in order to prevent the player from 
reaching salary arbitration eligibility for one extra year.94 Section B of this part 
examines a separate method by which teams manipulate a player’s service time 
in order to prevent the player from reaching free agency eligibility for one ex-
tra year.95 
                                                                                                                           
 87 Id. at 41–43. If the MLBPA and the LRD cannot come to an agreement, the two parties can 
choose to request a list of “prominent, professional arbitrators” from the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation and strike names from the list one at a time until one arbitrator remains as the Panel Chair. Id. 
at 41–42. In advance of the arbitration hearing, either party can alternatively elect to commission a 
three-member panel consisting of the Panel Chair and one arbitrator appointed by each party. Id. at 42. 
 88 Id. at 43–44. Once the arbitration hearing has commenced, the arbitration panel must follow all 
the rules of procedure described in Appendix A of the CBA. Id. at 44. The Panel Chair or Arbitration 
Panel’s authority in the arbitration process is given by the CBA as follows: 
With regard to the arbitration of Grievances, the Arbitration Panel shall have jurisdic-
tion and authority only to determine the existence of or compliance with, or to interpret 
or apply agreements or provisions of agreements between the Association and the Clubs 
or any of them, or between individual Players and Clubs. The Arbitration Panel shall 
not have jurisdiction or authority to add to, detract from, or alter in any way the provi-
sions of such agreements. 
Id. at 44. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text (discussing judicial review of labor-related arbi-
tration awards in federal courts). 
 92 See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text (providing an overview of service time). 
 93 See infra notes 96–109 and accompanying text. 
 94 See infra notes 96–109 and accompanying text. 
 95 See infra notes 110–140 and accompanying text. 
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A. Avoiding Salary Arbitration 
Until a player reaches the salary arbitration threshold, his club is not re-
quired to pay him anything more than the minimum salary, which is currently 
set at $507,500 for the MLB and set at a significantly lower monthly scale for 
each level of the minor leagues.96 Once a player is determined to be eligible for 
salary arbitration by either reaching three full years of service time or qualify-
ing as a Super Two player, he is able to petition for incremental increases in 
salary depending on his level of performance in the MLB.97 Though the salary 
arbitration process is not perfect at determining a player’s true value on the 
open free agent market, salaries agreed upon during or in advance of salary 
arbitration generally constitute a significant increase over the near-minimum 
salaries paid pre-arbitration.98 MLB teams, therefore, have an incentive to keep 
a player from salary arbitration eligibility for as long as possible.99 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See MLB Minimum Salary Remains at $507,500 for 2016, ESPN (Nov. 18, 2015), http://espn.go.
com/mlb/story/_/id/14161690/mlb-minimum-salary-remains-507500-2016 [https://perma.cc/5D5A-
FU9N]; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing salaries for newly-promoted major 
league players on their rookie contracts). 
 97 See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria for salary arbitration 
eligibility).  
 98 See, e.g., Justin Sievert, Breaking Down the MLB Salary Arbitration Process, SPORTING NEWS 
(Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.sportingnews.com/mlb-news/4690998-mlb-salary-arbitration-process-
breakdown-spring-training-2016 [https://perma.cc/49BZ-B353]. At their hearings, players and teams 
are only able to use information specifically allowed by Article VI of the CBA, which includes player 
performance in the previous season, the consistency of such performance over a player’s career, the 
player’s previous salaries, any physical or mental injuries, the performance of the team itself, and 
salaries of other players. Id.; see also 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 63, at 20–21 (providing 
the allowable criteria for the arbitrator’s consideration in salary arbitration hearings). Arbitration pan-
els themselves tend to be even more conservative than the CBA allows, focusing on traditional statis-
tics and comparisons between performance and compensation of players. See Salary Arbitration, 
FANGRAPHS, http://www.fangraphs.com/library/business/mlb-salary-arbitration-rules/ [https://perma.
cc/54AH-KADN] (last visited Aug. 10, 2016) (remarking on the “old school” tendencies and limited 
criteria used by arbitration panels in salary arbitration hearings). Because salary arbitration follows the 
final-offer arbitration model, players and teams have are disincentivized to make their offers too high 
or low, respectively. Frederick et al., supra note 75, at 130. In the absence of competitive offers from 
other teams that give players leverage during free agency, players will typically be awarded lower 
than their true free agent value. See Sievert, supra. 
 99 See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text (identifying financial incentives to keeping a 
player from reaching salary arbitration). The performance and salary trajectory of Philadelphia Phil-
lies’ first-baseman Ryan Howard at the beginning of his career helps to illustrate this point. See Street 
Wins AL Rookie of Year; Howard Wins NL, ESPN (Nov. 7, 2005), http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/
story?id=2216645 [https://perma.cc/P92A-82DX]. Howard debuted as a regular in the Phillies’ lineup 
in July 2005 after an injury to starting first-baseman Jim Thome, and went on to win the National 
League Rookie of the Year award. Id. The next season, Howard earned only $355,000 en route to 
winning the 2006 National League MVP award. Rob Maaddi, Ryan Howard Beats Phillies in Arbitra-
tion and Will Earn $10 million, USA TODAY (Feb. 21, 2008), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/
baseball/2008-02-21-1845392834_x.htm [https://perma.cc/9BJL-RRTV]. In 2007, the Phillies re-
warded Howard with a raise to $900,000, which at the time tied the record for the largest one-year 
salary for a non-arbitration eligible player. Todd Zolecki, The $900,000 Man, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 
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Of course, a team can choose to keep a player in the minor leagues during 
the seven-year minor league contract that he is required to sign upon being 
drafted.100 If, however, a player has the skill to play on the major league roster 
and the team wishes to utilize his services as such, the team may engage in 
service time manipulation by calling the player up late enough to prevent him 
from qualifying for Super Two status after his third season on the team.101 
Though the cutoff for the top twenty-two percent of service time between two 
and three years moves annually, a team can generally ensure that its prospect 
will never reach Super Two status if it promotes the player for the first time in 
mid-June, thereby giving the team a fourth year of the player’s services with-
out the threat of salary arbitration.102 
The treatment of outfielder Gregory Polanco serves as an illustration of 
service time manipulation conducted to avoid salary arbitration by preventing 
a player from reaching Super Two status.103 Polanco was signed by the Pitts-
burgh Pirates as a free agent in 2009.104 Polanco struggled until he broke out in 
late 2012, going from an unranked prospect to the number fifty-one-ranked 
prospect by Baseball America in 2013 and their number ten-ranked prospect in 
2014.105 In early 2014, Polanco was excelling at the Pirates’ AAA affiliate 
                                                                                                                           
3, 2007, http://articles.philly.com/2007-03-03/sports/25235733_1_phillies-hope-ryan-howard-bright-
house-networks-field [https://perma.cc/MP7N-4F2L]. After a 2007 season in which he placed fifth in 
NL MVP voting, Howard became eligible for salary arbitration, and was offered a $7 million salary 
by the Phillies. Maaddi, supra; Ryan Howard Statistics and History, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, 
http://www.baseball-reference.com/players/h/howarry01.shtml [https://perma.cc/9KXZ-D2RR] (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2016). Howard elected to send his case to arbitration, where he won the highest salary in 
arbitration history at $10 million. Maaddi, supra. Howard went on to sign a three-year, $54 million con-
tract after the 2008 season, and a five-year, $125 million contract after the 2011 season. See Ryan How-
ard Contract, Salary Cap Details & Breakdown, SPOTRAC, http://www.spotrac.com/mlb/philadelphia-
phillies/ryan-howard/ [https://perma.cc/5XDJ-RVH3] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016) (providing an over-
view of Howard’s contract history). 
 100 See Josh Leventhal, Minor League Players Sue for Better Salaries, BASEBALL AMERICA (Apr. 1, 
2014), http://www.baseballamerica.com/minors/players-sue-for-better-salaries/ [https://perma.cc/DV3C-
3FYW] (explaining that first-year players’ uniform contracts bind them to their respective organiza-
tions for seven years). 
 101 See Charlie Wilmoth, Should the Super Two Designation Be Changed?, MLB TRADE RU-
MORS (June 21, 2014), http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2014/06/should-the-super-two-designation-
be-changed.html [https://perma.cc/F5JC-H7G3] (explaining how Major League organizations can 
promote its players and still “feel safe” that he will not reach Super Two status). 
 102 Id. 
 103 See infra notes 104–109 and accompanying text. 
 104 Gregory Polanco Statistics and History, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-
reference.com/players/p/polangr01.shtml [https://perma.cc/D2WZ-5UAS] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
 105 See Tyler Kepner, Pirates’ Gamble Produces a Star, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/06/26/sports/baseball/pirates-gambled-to-get-gregory-polanco-where-he-belongs.
html [https://perma.cc/3N4L-F2BN] (providing an overview of Polanco’s rise to success in the MLB); 
Gregory Polanco Register Statistics and History, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-
reference.com/register/player.cgi?id=polanc001gre [https://perma.cc/AC6Q-UH7S] (last visited Apr. 
12, 2016) (providing an overview of Polanco’s career statistics). 
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while both of the Pirates’ major league right fielders struggled mightily.106 
Through fans’ and pundits’ calls for promotion, the Pirates kept Polanco in the 
minor leagues until June 2014.107 In doing so, the Pirates were accused of ma-
nipulating Polanco’s service time so that he will fall short of Super Two status 
and salary arbitration eligibility at the end of his 2016 season.108 Polanco went 
on to record the longest hitting streak to begin a career in Pirates history after 
his promotion.109 
B. Avoiding Free Agency 
Though salary arbitration can increase a player’s salary incrementally, 
salaries and lengths of deals increase dramatically in the competitive nature of 
free agency.110 When a team allows a player to become eligible for free agen-
cy, it runs the risk of significant salary increases as well as the possibility of 
losing the player altogether.111 Therefore, a team’s greatest incentive is to keep 
a player from eligibility for free agency for as long as possible.112 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See Wilmoth, supra note 101 (discussing Polanco’s experience with the Pirate’s minor league 
affiliate team). 
 107 See Ryan Gaule, Now Is the Time for Pittsburgh Pirates to Call Up Gregory Polanco, 
BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 28, 2014), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/2044682-now-is-the-time-for-
pittsburgh-pirates-to-call-up-gregory-polanco [https://perma.cc/AE6S-4EXM] (advocating for Pirates 
to promote Polanco to its major league team); Wilmoth, supra note 101. 
 108 See Bob Nightengale, Pirates Defend Gregory Polanco Move, But Will It Cost Them?, INDI-
ANAPOLIS STAR (June 18, 2014), http://www.indystar.com/story/sports/baseball/minors/2014/
06/17/gregory-polanco-caught-mlbs-super-rule/10716883/ [https://perma.cc/8RFA-BAFR] (discuss-
ing the accusations that the Pirates organization faced for its handling of Polanco); Wilmoth, supra 
note 101 (using Polanco’s situation with the Pirates to argue that MLB teams may be manipulating the 
service time and Super Two rules). 
 109 Travis Sawchik, Polanco Sets Pirates Record for Longest Hitting Streak to Start Career, PITTS-
BURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW (June 19, 2014), http://triblive.com/sports/pirates/6311679-74/polanco-game-
career [https://perma.cc/2HM6-4ZNK]. 
 110 See Sievert, supra note 98 (explaining that any increases in salary as a result of salary arbitra-
tion “will still likely earn [a player] a salary lower than their true value on the free agent market).  
 111 See id.; see also, e.g., Quinn Roberts, Price Charms as Red Sox Announce 7-Year Deal, 
MLB.COM (Dec. 4, 2015), http://m.mlb.com/news/article/158847426/red-sox-sign-david-price-to-
seven-year-deal [https://perma.cc/6G5Q-KYLU] (discussing the Red Sox’s free agent signing of 
pitcher David Price). In 2015, for example, Detroit Tigers pitcher David Price entered his final year of 
salary arbitration eligibility before free agency. Mike Axisa, David Price Smashes Arbitration Record 
with $19.75 Million Payday, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/eye-on-
baseball/24967075/david-price-smashes-arbitration-record-with-1975-million-payday [https://perma.
cc/67R5-EDUJ]. Price, an elite talent, received the largest one-year salary for an arbitration-eligible 
player in MLB history at $19.75 million for the 2015 season. Id. Mid season, the Toronto Blue Jays 
traded for Price with a package that included Baseball America’s eighteenth-ranked prospect in pro-
fessional baseball, Daniel Norris. Jeff Todd, Blue Jays Acquire David Price for Three Prospects, 
MLB TRADE RUMORS (July 30, 2015), http://www.mlbtraderumors.com/2015/07/blue-jays-to-
acquire-david-price.html [https://perma.cc/U9WV-Y7S2]. After the season ended, however, Price 
became a free agent and left the Blue Jays for a seven-year, $217 million contract with the Boston Red 
Sox. See Roberts, supra (discussing Price’s contract with the Red Sox). By allowing Price to become 
a free agent, the Blue Jays, who paid a significant price just to acquire him, watched even his record-
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As with salary arbitration, the easiest way to prevent a player from reach-
ing the free agent eligibility threshold is by keeping him in the minor leagues 
for as long as possible.113 Once a player has become too skilled to hold back 
any longer, teams typically engage in service time manipulation by waiting 
until there are less than 172 remaining service days to promote the player for 
the first time to the major league roster.114 If the player spends the remainder of 
his rookie season, as well as the entirety of the next five seasons on the major 
league roster, he will have five years and 171 days of service time at the end of 
his sixth season, falling just one day short of free agent eligibility.115 Practical-
ly, the player is prevented from becoming a free agent until he has accumulated 
six years and 171 days of service time.116 
A comparison of the Houston Astros’ treatment of outfielder George 
Springer with that of first-basemen Jon Singleton provides a particularly inter-
esting look into the problem of service time manipulation conducted to prevent 
a player from reaching free agency.117 George Springer was selected by the 
Houston Astros with the eleventh overall pick in the 2011 MLB first-year 
player draft.118 After receiving a $2.5 million signing bonus, Springer was as-
signed to Astros’ low A minor league affiliate Tri-City.119 By September 2013, 
                                                                                                                           
breaking yearly salary increase by over 50% and lost his services to another team. See Axisa, supra; 
Roberts, supra; Todd, supra. 
 112 See supra notes 110–111 and accompanying text. 
 113 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 114 See, e.g., Ryan Davis, Kris Bryant, the CBA, and the Grievance That Is and Might Be, BASE-
BALL PROSPECTUS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://wrigleyville.locals.baseballprospectus.com/2015/12/15/
kris-bryant-the-cba-and-the-grievance-that-is-and-might-be/ [https://perma.cc/SPF5-GYYM] (discuss-
ing service time manipulation generally and the pertinent example of Chicago Cub Kris Bryant). 
There are other instances in which teams may manipulate service time by other means. See, e.g., Jeff 
Passan, Sources: Kris Bryant, Maikel Franco Filed Grievances Over Manipulation of Service Time, 
YAHOO SPORTS (Dec. 7, 2015), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/sources--kris-bryant--maikel-franco-
filed-grievances-over-manipulation-of-service-time-213422124-mlb.html [https://perma.cc/G7EJ-
LZVE ] (discussing the potential service time manipulation of Philadelphia Phillies player Maikel 
Franco). For example, Philadelphia Phillies third basemen Maikel Franco alleges that the Phillies 
engaged in service time manipulation by promoting him to the major league roster at the close of the 
2014 season, then keeping him in the minor leagues at the beginning of the 2015 season until his ser-
vice time between the two seasons would add up to less than 172 days. Id. 
 115 See, e.g., Bryan Kilpatrick, Explaining MLB’s Service Time Rules, PURPLE ROW (Mar. 31, 
2015), http://www.purplerow.com/2015/3/31/8323263/kris-bryant-service-time-cubs-mlb-rockies-jon-
gray [https://perma.cc/3V7S-FTUB] (explaining that Chicago Cub Kris Bryant and Colorado Rockie 
Jon Gray will both finish one day short of six service years at the end of their sixth seasons). 
 116 See, e.g., id. 
 117 See infra notes 118–140 and accompanying text. 
 118 George Springer Statistics and History, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-
reference.com/players/s/springe01.shtml [https://perma.cc/BZP2-PMEK] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
 119 Brian McTaggart, Astros Sign First-Round Draft Pick Springer, MLB.COM (Aug. 16, 2011), 
http://m.mlb.com/news/article/23257134/ [https://perma.cc/RSZ7-ELUF]; George Springer Register 
Statistics and History, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com/register/
player.cgi?id=spring001geo [https://perma.cc/4MV6-LN3T] (last visited Apr. 12, 2016) [hereinafter 
George Springer Register Statistics and History]. 
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Springer had been escalated to the Astros AAA-level affiliate, and was thor-
oughly dominating minor league competition.120 Before even adding Springer 
to their forty-man roster, the Astros offered him a seven-year major league 
contract valued at a guaranteed $23 million.121 Had Springer accepted the deal, 
he would have been guaranteed a long-term deal, but also would have been put 
under guaranteed team control through all three years of his salary arbitration 
eligibility and his first year of free agency eligibility.122 Springer turned down 
the guaranteed contract, electing to play his trade at the league minimum salary 
until he reached salary arbitration and eventually free agency.123 
The surging twenty-four-year-old who was offered a $23 million major 
league contract, however, was not added to the Astros’ twenty-five-man active 
roster.124 Springer was not even added to the team’s expanded forty-man ros-
ter.125 Instead, he was kept in the Astros’ minor league system.126 When spring 
training began for the 2014 season, Springer was again assigned to minor 
league camp without being added to the team’s forty-man roster.127 Instead of 
playing for a guaranteed salary or even the league minimum salary on the ma-
jor league roster, Springer toiled away at the Astros AAA affiliate, while accru-
ing no service time that would inch him toward salary arbitration and free 
agency.128 
Just over two weeks into the 2014 MLB season, George Springer was 
called up to the Houston Astros major league roster.129 Because the Astros 
                                                                                                                           
 120 See Mark Townsend, MLBPA and George Springer’s Agent May File Grievance Over Service 
Time Issues with Astros, YAHOO SPORTS (Mar. 23, 2014), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/mlb-big-
league-stew/mlbpa-george-springer-agent-may-file-grievance-over-171248101--mlb.html [https://
perma.cc/DES4-UHMH] (“At the time, the 24-year-old outfielder was absolutely tearing it up at Dou-
ble-A and Triple-A, posting a .303/.411/.600 with 37 home runs and 45 stolen bases in 135 games.”). 
 121 See id. (explaining that the Astros offered Springer a seven-year, $23 million contract in Sep-
tember 2014, but still had not added him to the Astros forty-man roster as of March 2014). 
 122 See id. 
 123 See id. 
 124 See id. In response to Springer’s continued residence in the minor leagues, Fox Sports analyst 
Ken Rosenthal wrote, “[t]he obvious question: [i]f Springer was good enough to be offered $23 mil-
lion, why isn’t he good enough to crack the 25-man roster of a team that has finished with the worst 
record in the majors in each of the past three seasons?” Ken Rosenthal, System Discourages Teams 
from Promoting Top Prospects, FOX SPORTS (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.foxsports.com/mlb/story/
system-discourages-teams-like-astros-from-promoting-top-prospects-to-majors-031914 [https://perma.
cc/PTJ2-P8XD]. 
 125 Townsend, supra note 120. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 See id. (explaining that Springer was placed in the Astros’ minor league camp at the beginning 
of the season after being deemed “good enough to be offered $23 million” in a major league contract 
at the end of the previous season). 
 129 Zachary Levine, How MLB Service Time Dictates Top-Prospect Promotions, FOX SPORTS 
(Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.foxsports.com/mlb/story/how-mlb-service-time-dictates-top-prospect-
promotions-041914 [https://perma.cc/8SJN-KVE5]. 
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waited to call up Springer until mid-April, he was unable to earn a full year 
(172 days) of service time, which means that he will fall just short of the six-
year service time free agency eligibility requirement at the end of his 2019 sea-
son.130 Effectively, the Astros guaranteed that Springer would remain under 
team control until the end of the 2020 season before having the ability to enter 
the free agent market.131 Springer finished 2014 with the second most Wins 
Above Replacement (“WAR”) of any position player on the Astros.132 
In contrast, Jon Singleton’s path to the MLB was very different from that 
of George Springer, his own teammate.133 Singleton was selected by the Phila-
delphia Phillies in the eighth round of the 2009 first-year player draft.134 He 
received only a $200,000 signing bonus and was assigned to the Phillies’ rook-
ie league affiliate.135 Singleton worked slowly through the minors, progressing 
to high A level before he was traded to the Houston Astros in 2011.136 By 
2013, Singleton, who worked his way up to be ranked the number twenty-
seven prospect in all of baseball by Baseball America, joined Springer at the 
Astros AAA-level affiliate.137 In June 2014, Singleton accepted a contract 
similar in structure to the one Springer turned down; in exchange for giving up 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See id. Because Springer was called up in April and not later in the season, he will still likely 
be eligible for Super Two status at the end of his third season and be able to submit to arbitration 
early. See Tyler Drenon, George Springer Call Up: Did the Astros Get Strong-Armed into this Promo-
tion?, MLB DAILY DISH (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.mlbdailydish.com/2014/4/16/5619644/george-
springer-call-up-astros-bradley-diamondbacks [https://perma.cc/Z8EB-MBYZ]. There is speculation 
that the Astros called up Springer before assuring that he would not get Super Two status because his 
agent threatened to file a service time manipulation grievance. See Drenon, supra (speculating that 
Springer’s agent threatened to file a grievance and explaining the unorthodoxy of the promotion).  
 131 See Levine, supra note 129 (discussing the effects that the Astros decision will have on Spring-
er’s career). 
 132 2014 Houston Astros Batting Statistics, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-
reference.com/teams/HOU/2014-batting.shtml [https://perma.cc/45VL-MZ9X] (last visited Apr. 12, 
2016). WAR is an advanced statistic that calculates the number of wins a particular player can be 
expected to add to his team over that of a replacement-level player. WAR Explained, BASEBALL-
REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com/about/war_explained.shtml [https://perma.cc/
95WB-9XCS] (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). 
 133 Compare supra notes 117–132 and accompanying text (discussing George Springer’s path to 
the MLB), with infra notes 134–140 and accompanying text (discussing Jon Singleton’s path to the 
MLB). 
 134 Jon Singleton Register Statistics and History, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.
baseball-reference.com/register/player.cgi?id=single001jon [https://perma.cc/NW4Q-E424] (last vis-
ited Apr. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Jon Singleton Register Statistics and History]. 
 135 See Craig Edwards, Reviewing Jon Singleton’s Contract One Year Later, FANGRAPHS, http://
www.fangraphs.com/blogs/reviewing-jon-singletons-contract-one-year-later/ [https://perma.cc/L6HV-
JSBT] (last visited Aug. 14, 2016) (explaining that Singleton was given a $200,000 signing bonus 
after the Phillies drafted him); Jon Singleton Register Statistics and History, supra note 134 (showing 
Singleton’s placement in the Phillies’ rookie-league affiliate in 2009).  
 136 See Jon Singleton Register Statistics and History, supra note 134.  
 137 See George Springer Register Statistics and History, supra note 119 (showing Springer’s 
placement in the Astros’ AAA-level affiliate in 2013); Jon Singleton Register Statistics and History, 
supra note 134 (showing Singleton’s promotion to the Astros’ AAA-level affiliate in 2013). 
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potential earnings in salary arbitration, Singleton would be guaranteed $10 
million spread over five years.138 Singleton’s deal also came with a promise 
that he would be promoted to the Houston Astros major league roster upon 
signing.139 Singleton played the rest of the season on the Astros’ major league 
roster, finishing with the team’s third lowest WAR.140 
III. THE IMPLIED OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH 
The implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing is recognized as one 
of the foundational tools for post-execution contract interpretation.141 This Part 
provides an overview of the implied obligation of good faith doctrine in prepa-
ration for a discussion of its application to service time manipulation in Part IV 
of this Note.142 
The implied obligation of good faith can trace its genesis in American ju-
risprudence to the latter part of the Nineteenth Century.143 In order to avoid the 
heavy-handed consequences of strict formalist contract interpretation, the 
common-law doctrine was created to allow for courts to interpret the “spirit” 
of a contract and make decisions on the implied terms that embody that spir-
it.144 Since then, both the term “good faith” and the associated legal doctrine 
have grown significantly in definition and acceptance in American courts.145 In 
1951, the implied obligation of good faith was incorporated into the Uniform 
Commercial Code.146 Later, the implied obligation of good faith became so 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See Cliff Corcoran, Astros Sign First-Base Prospect Jon Singleton to Five-Year Deal, Call 
Him Up to Majors, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 2, 2014), http://www.si.com/mlb/strike-zone/2014/
06/02/astros-sign-jon-singleton-to-five-year-deal [https://perma.cc/AGR5-BK8P] (explaining the 
details of Singleton’s contract). 
 139 Mike Bates, The Astros’ Jon Singleton and an Offer He Couldn’t Refuse, SB NATION (June 4, 
2014), http://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2014/6/4/5776248/jonathan-singleton-astros-springer-extortion-
extension-Norris [https://perma.cc/DZ3F-VEC6]. 
 140 See 2014 Houston Astros Batting Statistics, supra note 132 (displaying the WAR of 2014 
Astros batters, including Singleton’s third-lowest WAR of -0.8). 
 141 See Dubroff, supra note 19, at 559, 561 (explaining that the implied obligation of good faith 
has become a “fundamental concept” of contract law, especially in the context of post-execution con-
tract interpretation). 
 142 See infra notes 143–166 and accompanying text. 
 143 Dubroff, supra note 19, at 559. 
 144 See id. at 562 (discussing the implied obligation of good faith’s role as a counterbalance to 
“conservative interpretation and gap-filling rules prevalent in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth 
centuries”).  
 145 See id. 559–61. 
 146 Id. The Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”), first published in 1951 by the American Law 
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, “is a comprehensive 
modernization of various statutes relating to commercial transactions including sales, leases, negotia-
ble instruments, bank deposits and collections, fund transfers, letters of credit, bulk sales, documents 
of title, investment securities, and secured transactions.” Uniform Commercial Code, AM. LAW INST., 
https://www.ali.org/publications/show/uniform-commercial-code/ [https://perma.cc/Y28Z-EPCB] 
(last visited Apr. 12, 2016); see also Dubroff, supra note 19, at 609 (discussing the U.C.C.). Though 
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widely accepted in American jurisprudence that it was also adopted by the re-
nowned Restatement (Second) of Contracts.147 Federal courts have recognized 
that the implied obligation of good faith is applicable to collective bargaining 
agreements.148 The doctrine is also used in arbitration proceedings regarding 
potential breaches of collective bargaining agreements.149 
As it now exists, the term “good faith” is used to refer to a multitude of 
contexts such that no one definition is all-encompassing.150 The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts definition that applies most contextually with this Note 
defines good faith as “faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and con-
sistency with the justified expectations of the other party.”151 The popular trea-
tise American Jurisprudence intuits that the implied obligation of good faith in 
this context prevents either party from “injuring the right of the other party to 
receive the fruits of the contract.”152 
                                                                                                                           
the U.C.C. itself applies generally to the categories stated previously, its adoption of the implied obli-
gation of good faith is considered “the most significant development in the history of the implied 
covenant of good faith.” Dubroff, supra note 19, at 609. 
 147 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST., 1981); see also Dubroff, 
supra note 19, at 559–60 (discussing the implied obligation of good faith’s inclusion in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts). Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states, “[e]very 
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its en-
forcement.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205. 
 148 See United Steelworkers of Am., Local Union No. 4264 v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 
352, 356 (10th Cir. 1959) (“[T]he covenant of good faith and fair dealings . . . must inhere in every 
collective bargaining contract if it is to serve its institutional purposes.”); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. 
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 495 F. Supp. 619, 636 (M.D.N.C. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 659 F.2d 
1252 (4th. 1981) (noting that federal courts routinely read the obligation of good faith into collective 
bargaining agreements). 
 149 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI: HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 9-50 to -51 (Kenneth May ed., 7th ed. 
2012) (discussing the common use of the implied obligation of good faith in both judicial and arbitra-
tion settings); see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 439 v. Sierra Chem. Co., (CCH) 06-1 
ARB ¶ 3390, 2005 WL 7992061 (2005) (Pool, Arb.) (“It has long been held that every CBA imposes 
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”). 
 150 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a. 
 151 See id. Professor Robert Summers refers to good faith as a “highly versatile doctrine,” identi-
fying the performance of contracts, the negotiation and formation of contracts, and the raising and 
resolving of contract disputes as the three broad categories in which it can be invoked. Robert Sum-
mers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 216, 220, 232, 243 (1968). Professor Summers further identifies several 
specific instances in which bad faith can be alleged: 
[N]egotiating without serious intent to contract, abusing the privilege to break off nego-
tiations, entering a transaction without intending to perform or in reckless disregard of 
prospective inability to perform, nondisclosure of known defects in the subject of a 
sale, abusing superior bargaining power, evading the spirit of a transaction, lack of dili-
gence, willfully rendering only substantial performance, and abusing the power to spec-
ify terms or to determine compliance. 
Summers, supra, at 216. 
 152 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 362. 
1390 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:1367 
That the good faith doctrine is widely accepted does not mean that it is 
uniformly construed and applied.153 Scholars point to differing judicial inter-
pretations, tests applied to establish breach of the obligation, and standards of 
review as the leading causes of shortcomings in the good faith doctrine.154 Still 
others refer to it as an “under-enforced legal norm,” or an “empty vessel.”155 
When the good faith doctrine is applied at common law, however, there are 
two concepts that the courts seem to have generally agreed upon.156 First is 
that the implied obligation of good faith should be used only to protect the in-
tents of each party as they expressed them in their initial contract.157 Second is 
that the good faith obligation requires that the party with the discretion to per-
form certain actions exercise that discretion in tune with the spirit of the con-
tract.158 
An investigation into whether a party has violated the implied obligation 
of good faith flows from the second concept.159 In forming such an investiga-
tion, a factfinder must determine whether the discretionary party used its con-
tractual discretion for reasons outside the justified and “reasonable expecta-
tions” of the parties when they entered into the agreement.160 The factfinder 
may also inquire into whether a party abused its discretion in order to obtain a 
result that should have been surrendered as a result of the contract.161 Essen-
tially, if a party uses its discretion in order to avoid or subvert the express and 
implied terms and purposes of the contract, it should be found to have acted in 
violation of the implied obligation of good faith.162 
Several courts have limited the obligation of good faith by finding that the 
doctrine cannot be used to overrule a provision explicitly stated in the con-
tract.163 It also may not be employed to add terms with new and reasonably 
                                                                                                                           
 153 See Paul MacMahon, Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an Underenforced Legal Norm, 99 
MINN. L. REV. 2051, 2051–52 (2015) (discussing the lack of consistency that has characterized 
courts’ application of the good faith doctrine). 
 154 See id. at 2052–53. 
 155 Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) Empty Vessel?, 
2005 UTAH L. REV. 1, 4 (using the phrase “empty vessel”); MacMahon, supra note 153, at 2051 (us-
ing the phrase “under-enforced legal norm”). 
 156 Frederick W. Claybrook, Good Faith in the Termination and Formation of Federal Contracts, 
56 MD. L. REV 555, 558 (1997). 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 See id. at 558–59. 
 160 Id. at 558. 
 161 Id. at 558–59. 
 162 See supra notes 159–161 and accompanying text (setting out the inquiry that leads to a finding 
of bad faith). 
 163 See Gen. Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 915 F.2d 1038, 1041 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting 
that the “obligation of good faith cannot be employed, in interpreting a contract, to override express 
contract terms”); Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 679 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(finding that the implied obligation of good faith in the context of the U.C.C. “may not be used to 
2016] Service Time Manipulation in Major League Baseball 1391 
unexpected duties to a contract.164 Many jurisdictions have also found that the 
implied obligation of good faith does not create an independent cause of action 
for breach of a contract.165 That is, any party that wishes to seek respite for 
breach utilizing the implied obligation of good faith must accuse another party 
of violating an explicit term of the contract, not a term implied by the good 
faith obligation.166 
IV. GOOD FAITH SOLUTIONS TO THE SERVICE TIME PROBLEM 
As recently as the 2015 season, players and the MLBPA have filed griev-
ances regarding service time manipulation with the MLB.167 Section A of this 
part will discuss a potential grievance for service time manipulation in the con-
text of the MLB’s grievance-arbitration procedures, analyzing both the 
strength of a player’s claim and the hurdles that he must overcome in succeed-
ing with his grievance.168 Section B of this part will discuss potential alterna-
tives to the MLB’s current formulation of service time that could mitigate ser-
vice time manipulation claims in the next CBA.169 
A. Challenging Service Time Manipulation as a Violation of the CBA 
Players have a colorable argument under the implied obligation of good 
faith that the manipulation of their service time violates the CBA between the 
MLB and the MLBPA.170 There is, however, no article of the CBA that sets, 
suggests, or even intimates rules that require an MLB club to assign players to 
various levels of professional baseball based on that player’s performance.171 
                                                                                                                           
override explicit contractual terms”); Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 138 
(5th Cir. 1979) (finding the implied obligation of good faith cannot be used to imply a restriction on 
an explicitly stated provision of a contract). 
 164 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI: HOW ARBITRATION WORKS, supra note 149, at 9-51 (concluding 
that the implied obligation of good faith cannot be used to add terms that create duties or obligations 
for parties subject to a collective bargaining agreement). 
 165 See id. at 9-51 n.264 (“It is clear from a review of the judicial and arbitration decisions that a 
claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will not stand on its own.”). 
 166 See id. (concluding that a plaintiff must allege a violation of statute or of an explicit term of 
the collective bargaining agreement in order before claiming that a violation constituted a breach of 
the implied obligation of good faith). 
 167 See David Brown, Report: Kris Bryant, Maikel Franco File Service-Time Grievances, CBS 
SPORTS (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/eye-on-baseball/25405003/report-kris-bryant-
maikel-franco-file-service-time-grievances [https://perma.cc/9TQF-NTHZ] (providing an overview of 
the service time grievances filed by Kris Bryant and Maikel Franco). 
 168 See infra notes 170–200 and accompanying text. 
 169 See infra notes 201–245 and accompanying text. 
 170 See infra notes 171–189 and accompanying text (discussing the argument for service time 
manipulation as a violation of the CBA) 
 171 See generally 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 63 (providing the entire CBA agree-
ment reached between the MLBPA and 30 Major League Clubs). 
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Because new draftees and minor league players that have yet to appear on a 
major league roster are not yet members of the MLBPA, the CBA does not 
even seem to cover their initial promotion into the major leagues.172 
The first step in such a claim is identifying and defining the justified and 
reasonable expectations of the MLBPA in regards to its agreement with the 
MLB.173 The MLBPA’s argument should be based on the notion that the CBA 
and the competitive nature of professional baseball itself identify the goals that 
the MLBPA reasonably expects MLB clubs to pursue: fully developing young 
talent, competing for championships, and profiting from the benefits of suc-
cess.174 The MLBPA can insist that the service time provisions of Article XXI, 
the salary arbitration provisions of Article VI, and the free agency eligibility 
provisions of Article XX of the CBA were negotiated with the expectation that 
clubs would act in concert with the goals that the MLBPA expected clubs to 
pursue.175 The MLBPA can assert that its reasonable expectation is that MLB 
clubs will assign players to the major league roster once club executives be-
lieve that players have reached full minor league development and can help the 
team compete for a championship.176 
Once it defines its reasonable expectations in regards to the relevant por-
tions of the CBA, the MLBPA can allege that MLB clubs that engage in ser-
vice time manipulation are acting outside of those expectations, counter to 
their implied obligation of good faith.177 When an MLB club uses its discretion 
to keep a player off of the major league roster in order to prevent that player 
from accruing service time, it acts to prevent players from receiving the “fruits 
of their contracts” in the form of eventual salary arbitration and free agency 
eligibility.178 The MLB can then assert that, instead of acting in pursuit of 
competition and “let[ting] the service time chips fall where they may from 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See id. at 1 (identifying the MLBPA as the representative of “Major League Baseball Players 
and individuals who may become Major League Baseball Players during the term of this Agree-
ment”). 
 173 See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing the first step in an inquiry into viola-
tion of the obligation of good faith). 
 174 See Wojciechowski, supra note 12 (discussing the competitive nature of baseball along with 
the express elements of the CBA giving rise to an implied obligation of good faith in player assign-
ment). See generally 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 63 (the CBA agreement between the 
MLBPA and 30 Major League Clubs). 
 175 See supra notes 72, 73, 76 and accompanying text (discussing the relevant provisions of the 
CBA). 
 176 See supra notes 173–175 and accompanying text (developing the MLB’s reasonable expecta-
tions for the purposes of a claim for violation of the implied obligation of good faith). 
 177 See supra notes 159–162 (describing the inquiry into a violation of the implied obligation of 
good faith). 
 178 See supra notes 71–77, 100–102, 113–116, 152 and accompanying text (describing the Arti-
cles in question, the methods by which teams intentionally manipulate service time, and the protection 
against preventing a party from receiving the “fruits of a contract” inherent in the implied obligation 
of good faith). 
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those baseball decisions” as the MLBPA reasonably expects, MLB clubs en-
gaging in service time manipulation act in pursuit of an unexpected goal: using 
service time as a tool to artificially lengthen the amount of time a player is un-
der team control at the lowest possible salary.179 
Though it seems obvious in some of the service time manipulation case 
studies that MLB clubs are acting with the goal of preventing a player from 
accruing service time, it may be difficult to allege that the club did not still act 
within the MLBPA’s reasonable expectations.180 Assignment to the major 
league roster involves discretion that is exercised by highly sophisticated play-
er personnel departments.181 Alleging that a club used this vast discretion for 
unexpected reasons may be a daunting task unless a club official clearly admits 
to ulterior motives.182 Likely cognizant of this, club officials in the case studies 
examined in this Note vehemently deny that a player’s assignment to the minor 
league roster has anything to do with service time.183 
In many cases of service time manipulation, however, the MLBPA would 
be able to use circumstantial evidence place serious doubt on the presumption 
that personnel departments of MLB clubs are acting in pursuit of non-service 
                                                                                                                           
 179 Wojciechowski, supra note 12. 
 180 See Davis, supra note 114 (describing MLB teams’ use of “subjective reasons for calling up 
players at arbitrary times” and claims of no service time connection as a “pack of lies”); 
Wojciechowski, supra note 12 (touting the belief that Kris Bryant’s demotion was entirely due to 
service time considerations while discussing the difficulty of proving such a claim). 
 181 See Gordon Wittenmyer, Boras: Resolve Bryant-like Service-time Disputes with Review Sys-
tem, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015, 7:38PM), http://chicago.suntimes.com/sports/boras-resolve-
bryant-like-service-time-disputes-with-review-system/ [https://perma.cc/84NT-585Z] (noting that 
“[p]ossible issues include the direct intrusion into clubs’ personnel decisions that may involve multi-
ple roster issues (another player’s options, 40-man considerations, etc.)”).  
 182 See Wojciechowski, supra note 12 (“The arbitrator would likely defer, to a certain extent, to 
the team’s explanations for [a player’s] demotion. It would be up to the union to show that those ex-
planations are bunk, which is a complicated thing to prove.”). 
 183 See id. (describing team executives’ reasoning for high-profile, service time-related player 
demotions as “less to do with offending fans than . . . fear of providing the union ammunition in 
grievance”). When Gregory Polanco was kept at the Pirates’ AAA affiliate until June 2014, team 
president Frank Connelly and general manager Neal Huntington denied any service time connection, 
citing their personal “comfort level” with his development. Nightengale, supra note 108. In the midst 
of the George Springer saga, Astros general manager Jeff Luhnow stressed minor league prospects’ 
readiness and opportunity to play meaningful time at the major league level when considering player 
promotion, declining to comment on “contract status or any of that stuff.” Evan Drellich, George 
Springer’s Promotion Date a Key Issue for Astros’ Future, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 16, 2014), http://
blog.chron.com/ultimateastros/2014/01/16/george-springers-promotion-date-a-key-issue-for-astros-
future/ [https://perma.cc/8JBA-G2KU]. When Kris Bryant was assigned to the Cubs’ AAA affiliate at 
the beginning of the 2014 season, team president Theo Epstein asserted that it was to continue his devel-
opment, especially on defense, at the minor league level. Mark Gonzales, Cubs’ Demotion of Kris Bryant 
Sparks Outcry, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 30, 2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/baseball/cubs/chi-kris-
bryant-javier-baez-addison-russell-demotions-20150330-story.html [https://perma.cc/M5FL-YWVA]. 
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time-related agenda.184 In cases where teams attempt to avoid free agent eligi-
bility, the MLBPA should point to the fact that a player was promoted to the 
major league roster just after he could no longer accrue a full 172 days of ser-
vice time in his first major league season.185 Though service time manipulation 
pursued to avoid salary arbitration eligibility may be more difficult to specifi-
cally refute, statistical analysis would allow the MLBPA to identify trends in 
player promotion that lead to avoidance of Super Two status.186 The MLBPA 
can also question and pursue definitive answers from coaching or scouting 
staff on whether there was any true development that was expected or that oc-
curred in the time that a player like Bryant, Polanco, or Springer was kept in 
the minor league system.187 Furthermore, each case of service time manipula-
tion is likely to have its own player and team-specific circumstantial evidence 
that refutes club claims that service time was not a factor in player promo-
tion.188 
After taking all of these aspects into consideration, it seems the MLBPA 
has an argument that is at least believable if not moderately strong.189 The 
claim’s viability, however, enters the great unknown when it is brought into the 
practical reality of the MLB grievance-arbitration procedures.190 At the many 
levels before a player or the MLBPA’s grievance reaches an arbitrator, the two 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See Davis, supra note 114. Davis posits that the MLBPA would not need “substantial proof,” 
but rather that it would need only to convince arbitrators that there is enough circumstantial evidence 
to support the notion that a delayed promotion was for the purpose of manipulating service time. Id. 
 185 See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text (discussing the service time manipulation 
method by which teams prevent players from reaching free agency). 
 186 See Levine, supra note 129 (noting spikes in the top-ten prospect promotion between days 
sixty and ninety of the regular season, and suggesting that teams to do so as a way to avoid the Super 
Two cutoff); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text (pointing out that the cutoff for Super 
Two status moves every year). 
 187 See Davis, supra note 114 (noting the type of evidence that may be useful to claim that a club 
was not forthcoming about their intentions with a player); Wojciechowski, supra note 12 (discussing 
the questions that the MLBPA or affected players could ask team executives and coaches to point out 
a disparity between what clubs say and what they actually do). 
 188 See, e.g., supra notes 106, 121–128, 133–140 and accompanying text (describing specific 
pieces of relevant circumstantial evidence in the Gregory Polanco and George Springer sagas). In 
Polanco’s case, such evidence may include the abysmal performance of all of the Pirates’ outfielders 
as the Pirates were involved in a close playoff race. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
Springer could introduce evidence regarding his being kept in the minor leagues after turning down a 
lucrative contract that likely would have guaranteed his promotion. See supra notes 121–128 and 
accompanying text. Springer would also have the ammunition of the Astros’ dealings with Jon Single-
ton, who was promoted immediately after signing his long-term contract. See supra notes 133–140 
and accompanying text. 
 189 See supra notes 173–188 and accompanying text (developing the MLBPA’s potential claim 
against the MLB). 
 190 See infra notes 191–200 and accompanying text (discussing the various potential outcomes in 
the grievance-arbitration process). 
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sides can reach a resolution that prevents the case from going to arbitration.191 
If the grievance eventually makes it through to a neutral arbitrator or arbitra-
tion panel, the outcome of the grievance is almost entirely up to the judgment 
of the arbitrators.192 
The difficulty in analyzing the potential outcome of a service time manip-
ulation grievance if it ever reached a neutral arbitrator comes from both the 
MLB’s grievance-arbitration procedure and federal case law concerning arbi-
tration awards.193 First, the MLB does not significantly outline the procedures 
or precedent that an arbitrator must follow.194 An arbitrator is not bound to use 
legal precedent that may lend support to an MLBPA claim that the implied ob-
ligation of good faith is generally found to exist in contracts at common law or 
that the implied obligation of good faith applies specifically in this situation.195 
At least one baseball analyst suggests that arbitrators often specifically avoid 
construing contracts using such uncertain legal doctrines.196 The widely re-
garded treatise, Elkouri & Elkouri: How Arbitration Works, however, explicitly 
calls out the implied obligation of good faith as a frequently used arbitration 
tool, and encourages its use as a means of making fact-specific judgments on 
contract breach issues.197 The treatise encourages the use of the doctrine to 
uncover bad-faith abuses of contractual discretion.198 
Even if the MLBPA did succeed in convincing an arbitrator of these two 
necessary pillars of its argument, there is no indication of the standard of def-
erence that the arbitrator would have to give to the explanations that clubs put 
forward for a player’s assignment, or how much evidence the arbitrator would 
allow into the case to refute such an explanation.199 If the arbitrator were to use 
                                                                                                                           
 191 See Davis, supra note 114 (noting that Kris Bryant’s grievance will only lead to impartial 
arbitration if the MLBPA and the MLB do not settle beforehand); Passan, supra note 114 (noting that 
open grievances concerning service time manipulation may never reach an arbitration panel, and that 
they could even be resolved in the bargaining process).  
 192 See Davis, supra note 114 (noting that arbitrators are not required to follow precedent, and 
that decisions are ultimately theirs to make freely); Wojciechowski, supra note 12 (noting that an 
arbitrator would likely give some deference to teams’ reasons for delayed promotions, and that arbi-
trator’s decision-making processes are difficult to predict). 
 193 See infra notes 194–200 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of guidance for arbitra-
tors in the grievance-arbitration process and the vast deference given to arbitrators in federal courts). 
 194 See 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 63, at 295–98 (establishing arbitration proce-
dures). 
 195 See Davis, supra note 114 (pointing out that arbitrators are not required to follow precedent).  
 196 See id. (quoting analyst Ryan Davis of Baseball Prospectus who points out that “spirit of the 
contract” violations are generally a “slippery slope” that arbitrators tend to avoid).  
 197 ELKOURI & ELKOURI: HOW ARBITRATION WORKS, supra note 149, at 9-50. 
 198 See id. at 9-51 (“Thus, the covenant serves as the basis for the proposition that managerial 
discretion must be exercised reasonably and discretionary management decisions will be reviewed to 
determine if they were arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory.”). 
 199 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 63, at 296 (noting that the Arbitration Panel Chair 
rules on the “relevancy and materiality” of evidence, and that it need not utilize formal legal rules of 
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its discretion and rule in favor of an MLB club accused of service time manip-
ulation, it is unlikely that the aggrieved party could find any respite in judicial 
review due to the immense deference given to arbitration awards in federal 
courts.200 
B. Service Time Alternatives 
Given the difficulty and uncertainty of winning a grievance based on ser-
vice time manipulation, pundits have suggested that the recent service time 
manipulation grievances will work more effectively as a bargaining chip to 
revamp the service time rules when the current CBA expires in December 
2016.201 A fix to the service time rules is not as simple as scrapping it in favor 
of immediate free agency, however, because of the value placed on competitive 
balance in the MLB.202 By depressing the salaries of young, talented players 
and keeping those players under team control for long periods of time, the ser-
vice time rules allow for small-market teams to compete with large-market big 
spenders.203 The service time rules thereby help to maintain competitive bal-
ance in a non-salary-capped league that would otherwise allow teams with the 
most money to run roughshod over those that may not be as flush with dispos-
able income.204 According to one analyst, officials from both the MLB and the 
MLBPA concede that the current service time rules need to be altered, but none 
can figure out how to fix them.205 This section will discuss several alternatives 
                                                                                                                           
evidence); see Wojciechowski, supra note 12 (pointing out that an arbitrator would likely give some 
deference to teams’ reasons for delayed promotions).  
 200 See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37–38 (1987); Nat’l Football 
League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 532 (2d Cir. 2016); see 
also supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text (discussing the deference given to arbitration awards 
on judicial review in federal courts). 
 201 See Brown, supra note 167 (noting that the difficulty of proving service time manipulation 
should shift the MLBPA’s focus toward better-bargained service time manipulation and free agency 
rules); Davis, supra note 114 (insisting that mainstream publicity and open grievances regarding ser-
vice time manipulation give the MLBPA leverage to find a solution in the collective bargaining pro-
cess). 
 202 See Grant Brisbee, Noah Syndergaard, George Springer, and Playing Around with Service 
Time, SB NATION (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/mlb/2014/3/21/5531100/noah-syndergaard-
george-springer-THE-SYSTEM [https://perma.cc/8SMZ-GZLD] (discussing service time and in-
stances of service time manipulation as necessary evils of competitive balance). 
 203 See id. (explaining that the current service time rules allow well-managed teams with less 
spending power to develop and field young talent at an affordable price, allowing for a more competi-
tive MLB). 
 204 See id. (“If baseball were some sort of Milton Friedman hellscape, with players becoming free 
agents after every season, it really would be the rich teams that won it all, every year.”). 
 205 See Ken Rosenthal, Delaying Arrival of Young Baseball Talent in Majors Is Getting Old, FOX 
SPORTS (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.foxsports.com/mlb/just-a-bit-outside/story/delaying-arrival-of-
young-baseball-talent-in-majors-is-getting-old-031715 [https://perma.cc/HF6L-DVBD] (Fox Sports 
analyst Ken Rosenthal discussing the challenges with trying to arrive at a new set of service time 
rules). 
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to the current service time rules, analyzing which may be the best candidates 
for the next CBA.206 
1. The Petriello Model 
One alternative model put forth by Mike Petriello of FanGraphs suggests 
changing the conception of a service year and reducing the number of days a 
player must accrue to constitute a year of service time.207 Petriello’s concep-
tion of a full year of service time focuses primarily on “qualified seasons” in-
stead of a running accumulation of service days.208 In Petriello’s model, a 
player must be on a major league roster for one hundred days of a single regu-
lar season to accrue one “qualified season” of service time.209 
As in the current model, players are required to accrue three years of ser-
vice to be eligible for salary arbitration and six years of service to be eligible 
for free agency.210 In order to take into account “replacement players,” who 
move from the major to the minor leagues for short periods of time for most of 
their careers, Petriello also suggests that a secondary running accumulation 
qualifies a player for free agency once he has reached one thousand service 
days, even if he has not yet reached six qualified seasons of service.211 This, he 
says, would allow owners some flexibility to use part-time players for almost 
the same number of service days as the current service time rules allow, while 
also not allowing a single team to control part-time players for more than ten 
years.212 
Petriello’s alternative model of service time, conceptualized in the days 
after the Bryant saga began, makes a good deal of sense to remedy the issue of 
promoting a player just after he can no longer accrue 172 days of service 
time.213 For a team that has made a commitment to competing for a champion-
ship and that has a star like Kris Bryant waiting in the minor leagues, the po-
tential consequences of waiting until late June to promote him in the Petriello 
model seem to significantly outweigh the benefits of added years of team con-
                                                                                                                           
 206 See infra notes 207–245 and accompanying text. 
 207 See Mike Petriello, It’s Time to Fix Baseball’s Broken Service Time System, FANGRAPHS (Mar. 
16, 2015), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/its-time-to-fix-baseballs-broken-service-time-system/ 
[https://perma.cc/CH5C-7RAX] (discussing the inequities of the MLB’s current service time system and 
proposing a new conceptual model). 
 208 See id. 
 209 See id. For example, if a player is on the major league roster for thirty days in season one, eighty 
days in season two, and ninety days in season three, he has accumulated two hundred total service days, 
but has still yet to accrue one qualified season of service time. See id. 
 210 See id. 
 211 See id. 
 212 See id. (acknowledging that part-time players may not reach the requisite threshold for a quali-
fied season, and devising the one-thousand-day fallback option). 
 213 See Petriello, supra note 207; Rosenthal, supra note 205 (expressing limited approval of Pe-
triello’s model). 
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trol.214 If a team is in the midst of a losing season or the prospect is less of a 
juggernaut than someone like Bryant, however, there seem to be few conse-
quences for waiting the additional seventy days in the Petriello model.215 
There is also, however, an advantage to the concept of the “qualified sea-
son” for mid-level prospects or for prospects on non-competing teams.216 Under 
the current model, a losing team or a team with a mid-level prospect with some 
upside is incentivized to keep prospects in the minor leagues until it is willing to 
start the clock on service time.217 Though teams in this situation will continue to 
be incentivized to keep players in the minor leagues for a certain amount of time 
under the Petriello model, there are few consequences to promoting a player af-
ter the one hundred days deadline has passed.218 Though the clock will start on 
the potential for a player to reach the secondary requirement of one thousand 
service days to be eligible for free agency, the player will not accrue a qualified 
season.219 He will, however, have the opportunity to show his skill against major 
league competition and have an opportunity to learn what it is like to play on a 
major league team for at least a short amount of time.220 
2. The Rosenthal Model 
Fox Sports Analyst Ken Rosenthal suggests that the current service time 
system can remain intact with only one small change.221 In this model, a club 
that promotes a rookie to its major league roster on Opening Day is granted a 
seventh year of control over the player in exchange for salary arbitration eligi-
bility after the player’s second year in the major league.222 Though Rosenthal’s 
idea makes sense in theory—both the club and the player benefit in some 
way—it only seems to address a Bryant-like situation, and fails to take into 
account the possibility that a player will be returned to the minor leagues for 
                                                                                                                           
 214 See Petriello, supra note 207. Petriello posits that, “for a player of Braynt’s caliber, it would 
be far more difficult for the Cubs to weather three months of public angst—not to mention a real, 
actual hit to playoff hopes—than it would be form them to do it for under two weeks.” Id.  
 215 See Rosenthal, supra note 205 (explaining that service time manipulation would likely still be 
a problem in different situations or for lesser prospects under the Petriello model).  
 216 See infra notes 217–220 and accompanying text. 
 217 Cf. supra notes 96–99, 110–112 and accompanying text (discussing the incentives for players 
to keep prospects in the minors under the current service time system). 
 218 See Petriello, supra note 207 (noting that players will accrue time toward a potential one thou-
sand service day free agency threshold, but that they will not accrue “qualified seasons” if promoted 
with less than one hundred days left in the season). 
 219 See id. 
 220 Cf. AJ Cassavell, Proposing a Callup Rule Change, SPORTS ON EARTH (Aug. 30, 2015), http://
www.sportsonearth.com/article/146182478/september-callups-longer-games-lineup-moves [https://
perma.cc/78ZF-XR6E] (describing similar incentives for players who are called up to the major league 
roster in September, when MLB active rosters expand from the usual twenty-five-man roster to the forty-
man roster). 
 221 See infra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 222 Rosenthal, supra note 205 (discussing Rosenthal’s conceptual model of service time).  
2016] Service Time Manipulation in Major League Baseball 1399 
any period of time.223 Rosenthal admits as much, adding that neither the play-
ers nor the owners would likely be open to the concessions.224 
3. The Age Model 
Another potential model ties salary arbitration and free agent eligibility 
directly to a player’s age, eliminating the conception of service time altogeth-
er.225 Because there is nothing a team can do about a player’s age, it follows 
that all decisions to assign a player to the major or minor league roster would 
necessarily be purely performance-based.226 No matter whether it is formulated 
as a strict age rule or a sliding scale of years from signing, however, an eligi-
bility age negatively impacts players who are drafted young and quickly make 
it to a major league roster.227 And in the opposite scenario, when a player takes 
a long period of time to develop, eligibility ages negatively impact clubs that 
have put in significant work to mold a prospect into an MLB player.228 
4. The Promotion Review Models 
Other models turn away from the service time rules and toward methods 
of reviewing player promotions in order to curb service time manipulation.229 
After Kris Bryant was placed in the minor leagues to begin the 2015 MLB sea-
son, agent Scott Boras began a public rally against the current reality of service 
                                                                                                                           
 223 See id. (Rosenthal explaining that his theory only applies to players who will remain on a 
Major League team for “the vast majority” of their careers). 
 224 See id. (Rosenthal conceding that his theory would be face issues with reaching a consensus 
among players and MLB organization owners). 
 225 See id. (discussing a proposal to tether service time rules to a player’s age). 
 226 See id.  
 227 See id. (considering the disparate impact that this model would have on a young, talented 
major league players). Fox Sport’s Ken Rosenthal considers the unfortunate impact such a model 
would have had on the Los Angeles Angels’ star outfielder Mike Trout. See id. Trout made his major 
league debut with the Angels in 2011, at nineteen-years-old. Mike Trout Statistics and History, BASE-
BALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com/players/t/troutmi01.shtml [https://perma.
cc/HQ9A-CDB9] (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). Since 2012, Trout has received awards for American 
League Rookie of the Year and American League MVP, and he has never finished below second place 
in MVP voting. See id. (providing in-depth statistics on Trout’s career). Under this type of model that 
is tethered to age, therefore, a player identical to Trout, who became so successful at a young age, 
would not be eligible for free agency until he had already accrued the equivalent of seven years and 
seventy days of of service time. See Rosenthal, supra note 205; Mike Trout Statistics and History, 
supra. 
 228 Cf. Lee Trocinski, Late Major League Debuts, SB NATION (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.
beyondtheboxscore.com/2013/4/6/4190260/late-major-league-debuts [https://perma.cc/MX25-CPG9] 
(describing instances of players making impacts on their major league clubs after debuting late in their 
careers). 
 229 See infra notes 230–239 and accompanying text. 
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time manipulation.230 To prevent service time manipulation, Boras suggested 
that a process be put in place in which the MLBPA or a player formally file a 
claim that a player should be placed on a club’s major league roster.231 If a an 
objective panel with scouting experience decides that a player is too advanced 
for the minor leagues, the player is placed on the major league roster.232 Alter-
natively, MLB players have suggested that a special post-promotion grievance 
procedure could be created to allow them to challenge decisions made in pur-
suit of service time manipulation.233 
Boras’s formulation of a promotion review panel seems to tamper too 
much with a club’s discretion to evaluate talent and make roster decisions.234 A 
post-promotion review procedure, similar to what the players suggest, howev-
er, seems to be an ideal solution.235 In that type of model, once a player is pro-
moted to the major league roster, he should be allowed a certain period of time 
to file a grievance alleging his promotion date was intended to circumvent 
good faith adherence to the CBA’s service time rules.236 Because this grievance 
process would specifically address the fact that service time manipulation ex-
ists and does so in violation of the implied obligation of good faith, the mys-
tery of the arbitration procedure would be greatly reduced.237 If a player can 
convince a neutral arbitrator that a team’s behavior was based on service time 
concerns (which is still no easy task), he can be eligible to be credited service 
days and possibly even back pay for a certain period of time.238 This model 
seems to be beneficial for both parties, keeping service time intact while allow-
                                                                                                                           
 230 See Boras: Resolve Bryant-like Service-time Disputes with Review System, supra note 181 
(recounting Boras’s conversations with reporters on the inequities of service time manipulation). 
 231 Id. 
 232 See id. (explaining that an objective panel would have to perform a “talent evaluation” and 
determine to what degree a player is ready for the major leagues).  
 233 See Rosenthal, supra note 205 (describing this type of procedure that would allow players to 
submit roster decisions to review). 
 234 See Boras: Resolve Bryant-like Service-time Disputes with Review System, supra note 181 
(pointing out flaws in Boras’s model for interfering with roster decisions).  
 235 See Rosenthal, supra note 205 (discussing the players’ suggestion that a specific grievance 
process be created for service time manipulation claims).  
 236 Cf. Wojciechowski, supra note 12 (noting that a player alleging service time manipulation 
“would be in the strongest position to win after the inevitable call-up” because he would have more 
evidence of the manipulation at this point). 
 237 See supra notes 192–200 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of predicting the 
outcome of a service time manipulation case once it reaches arbitration under the current arbitration 
procedures). 
 238 See Wojciechowski, supra note 12 (noting that the MLBPA can attempt to seek back pay and 
service time credit in Kris Bryant’s grievance); 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 63, at 48, 94 
(governing scenarios in which players can be awarded back pay as a result of team misconduct); see 
also supra notes 173–188 and accompanying text (discussing methods of proving that a team violated 
the implied obligation of good faith by intentionally engaging in service time manipulation). 
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ing for players to more easily challenge their alleged bad treatment at the 
hands of MLB clubs.239 
5. Toward an Ideal Hybrid Model 
Of the models suggested thus far, the Petriello model and the players’ 
post-promotion review model stand out as the most sensible and practical, and 
may be combined to create the MLB’s best solution.240 Although teams would 
likely have to give up some of their current tactics under the Petriello model’s 
reduced service time system, they are still able to keep players under control 
for up to six years in the major league, as is currently allowed by the CBA.241 
Teams also have the added advantage of being able to showcase talent at the 
end of the regular season without too much consequence to a player’s service 
time clock.242 Though some players who do not mean as much to their teams 
or who play for teams that do not have playoff hopes may still suffer service 
time manipulation consequences, high-profile cases of manipulation like those 
of George Springer and Kris Bryant would likely be eliminated.243 A hybrid 
would combine the Petriello model with the player-friendly post-promotion 
review model in which a player has the ability to assert a service time manipu-
lation claim after he has been promoted to a club’s major league roster.244 
Though this hybrid model would have to employ a standard of post-promotion 
review that would likely make it difficult for a player to prove manipulation, it 
still has the potential to provide an outlet for all of those athletes who may 
miss the benefits of the shortened service year rules created by the Petriello 
model.245 
                                                                                                                           
 239 See supra notes 235–238 and accompanying text (noting that the players would receive a spe-
cialized grievance-arbitration procedure to address service time manipulation that would not require 
owners to agree to a fundamentally different concept of service time).  
 240 See Petriello, supra note 207 (discussing Petriello’s “qualified season” conceptual model of 
service time); Rosenthal, supra note 205 (discussing the players’ post-promotion review procedure for 
service time manipulation).  
 241 See Petriello, supra note 207 (noting that teams would be disincentivized to delay promotions 
and manipulate service time for top prospects, but that they would still control players for six sea-
sons). See generally 2012–2016 Basic Agreement, supra note 63 (providing the entire CBA agreement 
between the MLBPA and 30 Major League Clubs). 
 242 See supra notes 218–220 and accompanying text (discussing incentives to call up players late 
in the season under the Petriello model). 
 243 See supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text (discussing potential differing treatment of 
players with different talent levels under the Petriello model). 
 244 See supra notes 229–233 and accompanying text (describing the basics of the post-promotion 
review model). 
 245 See supra notes 180–183 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of proving that a 
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CONCLUSION 
Since its inception, the MLB has employed a system in which clubs are 
allowed to reserve the rights to players for long periods of their careers in or-
der to promote player development and competition. In recent years, however, 
MLB clubs have utilized deficiencies in the service time system to gain extra 
years of control not contemplated by the MLBPA in their CBA. MLB teams’ 
service time manipulation of players like Gregory Polanco, George Springer, 
and most recently Kris Bryant has been met with outrage from players, pun-
dits, and fans. Whether the seemingly unfair treatment of these players can 
constitute a breach of the CBA between the MLB and the MLBPA, however, 
is a difficult issue to solve. The MLBPA has a moderately strong argument 
that service time manipulation violates the CBA by violating the implied obli-
gation of good faith. On the other hand, the many unknown aspects of the 
MLB’s grievance processes and arbitration procedures, as well as the vast def-
erence given to arbitration awards by federal courts, make it difficult to deter-
mine whether the MLBPA or any of its members would be able to succeed 
with a service time manipulation claim. With the dawn of a new CBA on the 
horizon, the MLB and MLBPA would be best served by negotiating a new 
model of service time that disincentivizes delayed promotions and affords a 
remedy to players whose service time has been manipulated, while still allow-
ing teams to develop home-grown talent at affordable costs. 
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